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 3
Introduction 
 
This study discusses the Common Market Organisation for Bananas, which was put in place 
in the European Union in 1993, with a view to assessing the implications of the change in 
2006. By 1 January 2006, at the latest, the EU will change the organisation from the present 
system with quotas for various producing countries and differential tariffs (and tariff 
preferences) for these groups, to a system based on tariffs only. 
 
This change of system implies that the EU changes its bound tariff on the import of bananas, 
and under the WTO rules this requires consultations with the countries concerned. An 
important element in this discussion is what tariff is likely to be equivalent to the current 
tariff-quota system. The present quotas are binding, both for the Latin American producing 
countries, and – so it seems – for the ACP countries, who are otherwise exonerated from 
paying the tariff of €75 per ton. The impact that these quotas have on the prices could be 
visible anywhere between producers and consumers, and some part of the study aims at 
‘locating’ the quota-rent. This rent may show up at wholesale level, at import level or 
between export and import. 
The WTO has been creating more or less official protocols for dealing with situations like 
this, but official rules on how to assess the impact of quotas or tariffs are not established. As 
part of the Uruguay Round negotiations, a procedure was developed to translate non-tariff 
barriers into tariffs that could be considered equivalent. But these need not be used in 
discussions on changes in a bound quota. 
We will argue in this study that they standard procedure, through a comparison with other 
consuming or producing countries, may not even apply in this case. Reason is that not only 
will the quota on Latin American import be removed, also the access of bananas from ACP 
countries into the EU will be enhanced. This latter aspect has considerable effect on the 
former. 
Three main fields are covered in this report. After the introductory Chapter 1, which shows 
the relative magnitudes of exports, imports and prices around the world, the EU policy over 
the past 12 years is reviewed. It reviews the past organisation of the banana market and its 
frequent changes. We will show that the country allocations that have in place did not matter 
much for the eventual prices facing the European consumers, although the system itself led to 
considerably higher prices. The proposed changes for 2006 are presented and the relevant 
texts of the GATT are highlighted. 
In Chapter 3, we explain the theoretical issues and prepare the ground for the modelling 
exercise. The theory makes clear that the changes in the world market prices are likely to be 
important, given the weight of the EU in this market. Taking this into consideration, we 
derive how the equilibrium price will change after removal of the quotas and we show how a 
tariff equivalent can be calculated. This calculation requires an estimate of the quota-rent, and 
we employ two ways of deriving the quota rent (or for that matter, the tariff-equivalent in its 
simple application). One way is by comparing the pre-CMOB period with period after 1993. 
This leads to an estimate that about 8 euro cents per kg is incorporated in the international 
margin between Latin American producers and the EU. The other is by comparing these 
margins over several groups, notable with ACP producers. This leads to same result. 
In addition to the presence of a quota rent in the trade with Latin American producers, we will 
argue for the same impact of quota rents on the trade with ACP countries in Africa. Here, 
there is no comparison possible with period before 1993 because another system, also limiting 
access to the market, was in place at that time. 
In chapter 4, the way in which elasticities are derived is discussed in great detail. A range of 
estimates is offered for all major producing and consuming countries, so as to provide an 
empirical basis for the selection of the elasticities.  
The application of theory and empirical findings is done in Chapter 5. We provide the results 
of various scenarios in which different assumptions are made on the level of a tariff in the 
situation after 2006. We give these in terms of export prices, import prices, tariff revenues 
and quantities traded.  
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Our conclusion is that a tariff of around 6 cents per kg or €60 per ton would be sufficient to 
compensate the African ACP producers for the change in the system. For the Caribbean ACP 
producers, the equivalence is less easily reached. Their prices are likely to fall. This may call 
for non-market based measures 
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Chapter 1  The world market for bananas 
 
1. Export supply and import demand 
 
The primary objective of this study is to evaluate different specifications of the EU tariff only 
import regime to be introduced in 2006. In order to get a quick insight into the trade flows in 
the international banana market we first look at export supply and import demand by trade 
block. Figure 1 summarizes the average exports of bananas from the main exporting blocks. 
The exporting blocks are slightly adjusted so that the definitions of the blocks corresponds to 
the groupings of exporting countries distinguished in the remainder of this study1 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Banana exports by exporting block (source: FAO STAT data, 2004) 
 From Figure 1.1it is clear that export supply on the world market of bananas is 
dominated by the Central and Latin America. Slightly above 85% of all traded bananas 
originate from these two blocks. The dominant position of these exporting blocks is even 
more manifest if one considers the Asian market as a separate segment of the world market, 
isolated by from the rest of the world by substantial transport costs. 
Likewise we can summarize the import demand of the main trade blocks. This is 
implemented in Figure 2. The import demand is dominated by the USA (& Canada) and 
Europe2, who account for 77% of total imports.  The figure also shows the share of the 2004 
EU accession countries (5%) and the non-EU part of the European share (8%). Import 
demand from Asia, which comprises mainly Japan, China and Korea is around 19% and 
increasing. 
 
 
                                                          
1 In particular: Mexico is included in Central America, Belize is excluded from Central America and 
included in Caribbean, Surinam is excluded from South America and included in Caribbean. 
Guadeloupe and Martinique are not included in Caribbean. The background is to include all ACP 
Caribbean countries to “Caribbean”, and to exclude non-ACP countries (European producers). 
2 For this purpose we have used a broad definition of Europe, including the 10 countries that have 
accessed the EU in 2004, and also including a number of non EU countries (Switzerland, Norway, 
Iceland), East European countries (Bulgaria, Romania), Russia and  North African countries (e.g. 
Algeria, Morocco). 
Africa
4%
Asia
16%
South America 
(excluding Surinam)
46%
Caribbean 
(including Belize & Surinam, 
excluding Guadeloupe & 
Martinique)
3% Central America
(including Mexico, 
excluding Belize)
40%
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Figure 1.2 Banana imports by importing block (source: FAO STAT data, 2004) 
We now take a closer look to the different export supply blocks in order of quantitative 
importance. In Figures 1.3a to 1.3d we have presented the contribution of the main exporting 
countries within each block. Central and Latin American exporters are taken together in 
Figure 1.3a: this figure shows that Ecuador is by far the largest exporter with more than twice 
as much exports compared to the second largest exporter, Costa Rica. Colombia, Guatemala, 
Panama and Honduras follow in this order. The remaining exporters are of negligible 
importance. Within the Asian block the dominance of the Philippines is apparent from Figure 
1.3b. Exports from the Philippines are in size between Costa Rica and Colombia. All other 
Asian exporters are of minor importance. Both the Caribbean and African block are much 
smaller compared to the Central and Latin American block and the Asian block. Within the 
Caribbean block the Dominican Republic stands out as the largest exporter, accounting for 
nearly a third of total Caribbean exports. A further group of six Caribbean countries (Belize, 
Saint Lucia, Jamaica, Saint Vincent, Surinam and Dominica) exports less than half of 
Dominican Republic exports. Grenada has negligible exports. 
Likewise, we may have a closer look at the composition of import demand. This is 
implemented in Figure 4a to 4e. The first three figures show the European imports: the EU15 
countries, the 10 countries that accessed the EU in 2004, and the remaining non-EU countries. 
In the first figure imports from Germany, Belgium & Luxembourg, United Kingdom and Italy 
constitute the larger ones. Re-exports partly obscure the underlying consumption. This is most 
apparent in the case of a small country like Belgium & Luxembourg, but most likely applies 
as well to the other larger importers3. Among the accession countries Poland is a sizeable 
importer. Russia is the largest non-EU European importer.  
 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that the population size in France, UK and Italy is similar.  
EU15
27%
Other Europe
8%
USA & Canada
37%
Asia
19%
Latin America
4%
EU10 
(2004 accession countries)
5%
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Figure 1.3a Central and Latin American Exporters (average 2000-2002) 
Source: FAO STAT data, 2004 
 
 
Figure 1.3b Asian Exporters (average 2000-2002)  
Source: FAO STAT data, 2004 
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Figure 1.3c Caribbean Exporters (average 2000-2002)  
Source: FAO STAT data, 2004 
 
 
Figure 1.3d African Exporters (average 2000-2002)  
Source: FAO STAT data, 2004 
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Figure 1.4a European Union, 15 members, gross import (average 2000-2002)  
Figure 1.4b 2004 EU accession countries, gross import (average 2000-2002)  
 
Figure 1.4c Non EU European importers, gross import (average 2000-2002) 
Source: FAO STAT data, 2004 
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Figure 1.4d North- and Latin American importers (average 2000-2002)  
Source: FAO STAT data, 2004 
 
Figure 1.4e Asian importers (average 2000-2002)  
Source: FAO STAT data, 2004 
 
 
1.2 Export prices and import prices 
 
There is no international market price of bananas that is widely recognized as the main 
international price of bananas. Unlike many other commodities there is no futures exchange 
in bananas, simply because bananas are perishable and hence non-storable, which prevents 
the existence of a banana futures contract. There is a tendency to look at the prices prevailing 
in non distorted markets and regard these prices as reasonable reflections of the balance 
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between supply and demand. A standard technique to identify prices if these are not published 
is to calculate export or import unit values, i.e. export in value (import in value) divided by 
export in quantity (import in quantity). If import and export data are available these data also 
allow identifying country specific price movements. Export unit values can be treated as 
equivalent to FOB prices and import unit values as CIF prices. Consequently export unit 
values may be regarded as marginal costs of banana producers to deliver bananas for export. 
In between export and import unit values we have transport costs and other transaction costs. 
In subsequent chapters we will argue that the difference between these two unit values is also 
influenced by import policies and we will explain in what way.  
Figure 1.5 shows the export unit values of different export supply blocks, the blocks 
that we will identify throughout this study. Provided these calculated export unit values 
express the marginal cost of export supply the figure makes clear that these marginal costs are 
highest for ACP Caribbean exporters and European producers. Central and Latin American 
exporters have much lower marginal costs, while marginal costs of African ACP exporters 
oscillates around the export unit value of Central and Latin American exporters during most 
of the time, but approaches these in recent years. This evidence clearly suggests that the 
European and ACP Caribbean producers are the high cost producers in the banana market. 
Asian exporters, who a largely separated from the European and North American market by 
high transport costs, have the lowest marginal costs 
 
Figure 1.5 Export unit values of major export supply blocks 
(weighted average of country data, centered average with a 5 year moving window) 
Source: calculations on the basis of FAO STAT data, 2004 
 
In a similar way as in Figure 1.5 we have plotted import unit values of different importing 
blocks over the years. These are shown in Figure 1.6. North American import unit values are, 
throughout the last 40 years, continuously below the import unit values of Europe – in this 
case the countries of the current European Union with 15 member countries – and Asia. At 
this stage it appears sufficient to remark that the difference between the import unit values of 
different blocks is far from constant, which would be the case in undistorted markets also 
with sufficient competition in transport: the lines in Figure 6 are not even approximately 
parallel. The Asian import unit values peak between 1985-1995, and afterwards appears to 
move parallel with North American import unit values. For comparative purposes we have 
presented Figure 5 and 6 also (respectively) relative to the Central and Latin American export 
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unit values (Appendix to Chapter 1, Figure A1) and relative to North American import unit 
value (Appendix to Chapter 1, Figure A2) 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Import unit values of major import demand blocks 
(weighted average of country data, centered average with a 5 year moving window) 
Source: calculations on the basis of FAO STAT data, 2004 
 
 
 
 
In the remainder of this study we will investigate the Chapter 2 the EU import policy, the 
current WTO regulation, the EU intentions and the position of Colombia. In Chapter 3 we 
will further investigate the methodology of tariff equivalent and the empirical basis for the an 
estimate of the quota rent. In Chapter 4 we will estimate supply and demand elasticities, 
investigate other important parameters in constructing a simulation model and formalise a 
partial equilibrium model. In Chapter 5 we present the simulations and discuss the various 
suggestions for a tariff in the 2006 tariff only system. Conclusions are drawn there.  
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
Figure A1 Export unit values of major export supply blocks  
    relative to export unit values of Central & Latin America  
(weighted average of country data, centered average with a 5 year moving window) 
Source: calculations on the basis of FAO STAT data, 2004 
 
Figure A2 Import unit values of major import demand blocks relative import  
unit values of North America 
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2. EU import policy of bananas 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As of 1st January 2006, a new regime in the European Union (EU) will be put in place 
regarding the imports of bananas into the EU. The new regime will be based on a tariff-only 
system, implying that the current system with tariff-rate quota will be abandoned. The new 
tariff will apply to all producing countries, but a tariff preference is to be given to ACP 
producing countries. 
In implementing the new system the European Commission seeks “to maintain a level of 
preference to the ACP countries equivalent to that afforded by the enlarged Community of 
25” (Council communication COM(2004) 399 final.). 
This transitional period started in July 2001 and comprises a system in which 2.553 million 
tons (2.653 as of 2002) are permitted from any producing countries, subject to a tariff of €75 
per ton in case imports come from non-ACP countries. After 1 May 2004, the quota for 2004 
was increased by 0.3 million tonnes to cover import needs of the 10 new EU Members States. 
A quota of 0.85 million tons of bananas (0.75 as of 2002) can be imported without duty from 
ACP countries. In addition to these import quotas, a production of around 0.85 million tons is 
coming from EU territories that fall under special arrangements. Imports above quota are 
subject to tariffs of €680/ton for non-ACP countries and €300/ton for ACP countries. 
(Prevailing prices in the world market are around the €544 per ton FOB Hamburg, quoted for 
March 2004 (FAO).)  
 
In this section we review the policies concerning imports of bananas into the EU in the past. 
We provide details of the actual policies in place, and investigate to what extent these policies 
have affected the prices facing the European importers. We start with the situation before 
1993 in order to make clear how restrictive the EU policy was even before the introduction of 
the Common Market Organisation for Bananas. 
We then list the measures taken in 1993, 1995, 1999 and 2002 and investigate if the changing 
restrictions have actually resulted in different distribution over exporting countries. If so, 
abolishing the quota might have an effect on the prices beyond the traditional effect of lifting 
a restriction on total supply. 
After this, we sketch the changes envisaged for the EU banana market regime, we provide the 
texts concerning GATT article XXVIII that suggest which approach to take. The Appendices 
provide the full texts, taken from WTO and other sources, including the “Procedures for 
Negotiations under Article XXVIII”. 
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2.2 Overview of EU Banana policies and their effects 
 
The EU regime before 1993 
It is important to look at the regime before 1 July 1993 in order to assess to what extent the 
imports of bananas were restricted at that time. Knowledge of this helps understand a possible 
cause for changes in the prices before and after the introduction of the Common Market 
Organisation. 
 
In a review given by Badinger (2001) the following information is given on the pre-CMO 
regimes.   
 Austria, Finland, Germany and Sweden did not apply any quantitative or tariff 
restrictions. Only Germany, of course, was member of the EU in 1993.  
 Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland applied a tariff only 
system with 20% import tariff, but with free access for ACP and EU bananas. 
 Italy had a quota system in place for non-ACP bananas; quota were adjusted regularly to 
meet consumption demand. Market share of ACP bananas was 8% in 1992. 
 The U.K. had a similar system (with adjustable quota) in place, but its ACP focus was on 
the Caribbean producers. Market share of ACP bananas was no less than 64.7% in 1992. 
 The Other EU Member states, Spain, France, Portugal and Greece had and have 
substantial production of bananas.  
 In France this covered two third of the market, with the remainder allocated to 
African ACP producers. Allocation to individual countries was proportional: 44% for 
Martinique, 22% for Guadeloupe, 33% for Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon together. 
There were hardly any additional imports permitted. 
 Spain had its market entirely reserved for bananas coming from the Canary Islands. 
 Portugal had a special quota reserved for bananas coming from Madeira, but its 
market share was only small.  
 Greece had high tariffs imposed on imports of bananas in order to protect its own 
producers. Nevertheless, by 1992, almost all bananas came from Latin America. 
 
In 1992, therefore, a free market existed only in the North Western countries, barring the UK. 
Their share of EU consumption at that time was approximately 45%, and – given the 
dominant position of Germany – subject to an average tariff of 1.5% only. 
Other EU imports were basically restricted and higher prices would normally prevail in 
France, Spain and the UK an Italy than would otherwise have been the case. If we would want 
to express this as an EU-15 quota, we might take this to be equal to what the ‘free market’ 
countries imported plus the consumption in the rest of EU15. This virtual quota would come 
at around 3.7 million tonnes. 
 
Table 2.1 EU15 gross imports in 1992 
Thousand tons Tariff/quota Imports ACP EU non-ACP 
Germany 0% 1379 3 0 1376 
Benelux, Ireland, Denmark 20% 300 7 0 293 
UK, Italy, Greece, Portugal Flex quota 1474 373 67 1034 
France, Spain* Strict quota 510 189 321 0 
Total imports 3663 573 388 2702 
*Shipments from Canary Islands to Spain were not counted as imports.  
Source Badinger(2001)  
 
By 1 July 1993, therefore, around 45% of EU imports faced a free market and price 
formation, while the rest was subject to quantitative restrictions. These restrictions favoured 
some imports, notably from ACP countries, and hindered other imports, notably from Latin 
America. 
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Transition to the CMOB 
How did all this change with the introduction of the Common Market Organisation for 
bananas? Imports from ACP countries were still free to enter into the whole of the EU 
without tariffs, although limited to a maximum of 857.7 thousand tonnes for traditional ACP 
countries and 90 thousand for non-traditional ACP countries. Imports from non-ACP 
countries were restricted by a quota of 2 million tonnes minus the 90 thousand for non-
traditional ACP. EU production was supported by deficiency payments up to a maximum of 
854 thousand tonnes. 
Total quota plus EU production amounted therefore to 3.7 million tonnes, i.e. some 10% 
below the consumption in the EU in 1992 (estimated at 4.1 million).  
 
In addition, for imports from the other countries a tariff of €100 per tonne had to be paid. At 
the ruling import (CIF) price of 1992, equal to ($520/ton=) around €420/ton, this €100 
amounted to some 24% and even higher when we take the green ECU into account. 
 
Hence, in the erstwhile free countries, the new tariff had an upward pressure on the prices, 
even where the tariff was 20%. The upward pressure was reinforced by the restricted supply 
resulting from the new quota. In the other countries, however, such as France and the UK, the 
new regime led actually to larger imports of bananas and from a wider supply base and even 
had a downward effect on the prices. 
 
Table 2.2 Retail prices in selected countries US$/kg 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
USA 1.020 1.060 1.010 0.980 1.020 
Germany 1.680 1.550 1.430 1.530 1.920 
France 2.090 2.200 2.330 1.980 2.030 
UK 2.040 2.100 1.870 1.510 1.520 
Source: FAO, Banana Statistics CCP:BA TF 01/2 
 
On a monthly basis, prices change rather abruptly with the introduction of the new regime. 
Figure 2.1 shows this for the month of introduction, July 2003, when wholesale prices in 
France fell by even more than prices in Germany rose. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Retail prices in France, Germany and wholesale prices in the UK, 1993-1994 
relative to their mean values of 1992 
 
The introduction of the Common Market Organisation has led, therefore, to diverging results 
for the various EU countries. Clear effects for the EU-12 or, for that matter, the EU-15 
(established in 1995 with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden) cannot be established 
without entering into detailed country analysis. This would lead us too far from the analysis 
of the present situation. The events after 1993 show however that the EU as a whole may 
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show quite different results than individual countries, and that ‘a law of one price’ does only 
approximately and in the longer run hold true for the EU banana market.  
 
Changes in later years 
The original quota of 2 million tonnes for non-traditional ACP imports was enlarged to 2.2 
million tons in 1994, while another quota of 0.353 million tons was added in 1995 to account 
for the then new member states Austria, Sweden and Finland. As of 1 January 1995, in the 
Framework Agreement, specific quotas were allocated to Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua 
and Venezuela, together amounting to 49.2% of the dollar-bananas quota. The tariff on dollar 
bananas was reduced from €100 per ton to €75 per ton. Colombia’s share in EU imports was 
set at 21% of the 2.2 million tons. 
An extra quota was allocated to non-traditional exporters: Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon each 
received 7.5 thousand ton, Belize 15 thousand tons and Dominican Republic 55 thousand 
tons, while 5 000 tons were open to other non-traditional exporters.  
 
1999 
The regime was changed again, effective from 1 January 1999. Traditional ACP quota were 
maintained, but without country allocation. A quota of 2,553 thousand tonnes was allocated to 
non-traditional ACP and non-ACP countries. Within the quota a country allocation was made:  
Ecuador  26.27% 
Costa Rica  25.61% 
Colombia  23.03% 
Panama  15.76%  
The remaining 9.43% (240 278 tonnes) is allocated to non-traditional ACP bananas (EU 
Court of Auditors, 2002). Probably, other dollar exporters (Nicaragua, Venezuela etc.) fell in 
this category too. Tariffs were maintained at €75 per ton for dollar bananas. 
 
2002 
A further change became effective on 1 January 2002. The country allocation to dollar banana 
exporting countries and the non-traditional ACP allocation were abolished. The quota was 
raised from 2,553 thousand tons to 2,653 thousand. The traditional ACP quota was reduced 
by the same amount to 750 thousand tons. In addition, the imports from Dominican Republic 
were considered as within the ACP quota in stead of in the non-traditional ACP group that 
was within the third country quota (Smith, 2002). Dominican Republic had a quota of 55 
thousand tonnes under the regime of 1995 (EU Court of Auditors, 2002), but exported close 
to 100 thousand tons to the EU by 2002. Thus the scope for exports from the dollar zone 
improved considerably. 
 
Licenses 
Any system with quotas implies that licences should be given to some importers, who may 
then benefit from the possibility of selling in a market where supply is restricted.  
The initial system allocated 66.5% of the import licenses to traditional operators of bananas 
from non-traditional ACP and other countries, and 30% to operators of EU and ACP bananas, 
distributed within these groups over importers (57%), traders (15%) and ripeners (28%). The 
latter allocation of 30% was much higher than the actual share of ACP imports into the EU, 
which was 15% in 1992. This gave rise to trade in licences from ACP-operators to dollar-
zone operators. It should have contributed as well to the decrease in retail prices in France and 
the UK, the traditional markets for these operators. In 1999, the allocation system was 
changed and 92% of the licences were allocated to traditional operators based on their shares 
in the market between 1994-1996 (with some ad hoc adjustments for firms that suffered from 
the hurricanes in Central America). For new comers 8% was reserved. 
 
The system is presently based on historical performance of importing firms since 1st January 
2002. The allotment of the licences in 2002 for the non-ACP quota was made to traditional 
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operators (83%) and non-traditional operators (17%). For the traditional operators it was 
based on their performance in 1994-1996 as registered in 1998.  
 
Effects of quota changes on average FOB prices 
The changes over time in the quota allocated to the cheaper suppliers from Latin America, 
and the changes in the allocation within this group, may have had influences on the prices 
facing the EU importers. We turn now to an investigation of this effect. 
 
Source of data for the imports into the EU is a European Commission publication (IO 04/707) 
of 20 April 2004. The table is in the appendix C.  
 
The approach taken is to combine the FOB prices for the countries in each group, calculate 
the weighted average of these FOB prices and show what effects changes in the regime may 
have had on the average FOB price facing European importers. The calculations show that 
when the country allocation of the quota within the ACP group would have remained fixed at 
their 1993 levels, higher prices for the group would have resulted. That is, the changes in 
country quota or freedom in their allocation enabled low costs producers to sell more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 FOB prices ACP countries (US$/kg), weighted by import shares into EU15 
 
Within the Latin American group, differences are very small: had the country allocation of 
1999 to the major exporters (approx. 90% of non-ACP imports) prevailed throughout the 
period, the resulting average FOB price would not be different. The implication is that the 
country quotas (first to Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela and Nicaragua; and later to 
Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama) have not had significant influence on the FOB 
prices.  
Finally, we look at the distribution over the major groups of ACP and non-ACP countries. If 
the 1995 weights had been maintained, prices would have been slightly higher (less than one 
dollar-cent per kg) than they actually were. Hence the changes in weights led to a reduction of 
the costs of bananas for the EU. As is clear from the two graphs, dollar bananas consistently 
show lower FOB prices, so that higher relative quotas for dollar bananas would lead to more 
cost savings. 
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Figure 2.3 FOB prices (US$/kg) EU suppliers, 
weighted by import shares of ACP and dollar Zone 
 
As Figure 2.3 shows, the actual mean prices in 2003 are not much different from the prices 
using weights of 1993, in spite of the larger quota assigned to dollar zone bananas. The reason 
is the decrease in FOB-prices of ACP countries, notably in Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire. The 
closer ACP FOB-prices are to dollar-zone prices, the less important restrictions are. 
 
The conclusion of the above calculations and graphs is that the changes that have occurred 
over the past years have not lead to significant changes in the relative positions of the major 
non-ACP suppliers. Within the ACP group, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Dominican 
Republic have increased their shares of the market, which benefited from their low FOB 
prices. 
 
2.3 The EU proposal for 2006 and the GATT 
 
We now turn to the present situation and consider the case of the change in the EU tariff 
quota, envisaged for 2006. On the one hand, it implies the transformation of a quota into a 
tariff, which begs the question of the tariff equivalent of the quota. This was a major concern 
in the era of the Uruguay Round and many publication provide guidelines on how this should 
be done, including an authoritative publication by the OECD, written by Deardorf and Stern 
(1997). On the other hand, the change in 2006 entails a change in a bound tariff, which 
requires negotiations with the parties concerned under article XXVIII of the GATT. The latter 
is what is important, but we shall see that the relevant calculations will include the former 
aspect of a tariff equivalent. 
 
On 11 April 2001, after lengthy negotiations, the EU reached an agreement with the USA and 
Ecuador about the steps to be taken in regard of the banana market organisation. Quoting 
from a European Commission communication (COM (2002) 763) 
 
According to Council Regulation (EC) No 216/2001 the EU will remove the tariff 
quota structure and introduce a “tariff only” regime for banana imports no later than 
1 January 2006. The level of the tariff has not as yet been determined but will be 
discussed in the WTO under GATT Article XXVIII. The EU obtained two waivers in 
the WTO to cover these arrangements. The first covers the tariff preference for 
imports of bananas as well as other products from the ACP under the Cotonou 
Agreement until 2008. The second covers the reservation of quota C for the ACP 
countries only between 2002 and end 2005. Under the future “tariff only” regime, the 
ACP countries will continue to benefit from a tariff preference. 
 
Thus, the EU envisages discussions with the parties concerned under GATT article XXVIII, 
whilst taking two WTO waivers into account, one relating to the tariff preference for ACP 
countries, and one relating to the quota for ACP producers. 
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The proposal of a tariff-only system came after other proposals had been envisaged, including 
a system with even more quotas and a mixed system, in which the present non-ACP quota 
would be maintained, but no quota would be set for the ACP countries. In an internal EU 
proposal, discussed in the EU Special Committee on Agriculture, 7 and 8 June 1999, the 
Commission suggested that a tariff of €275/t be considered, consisting of €200/t for the 
licence and €75/t for the present tariff.  
 
The text of Article XXVIII is given in the Appendix A, inclusive of the interpretation, as 
provided by the WTO web site. Appendix B provides the text of the “Procedures for 
Negotiations under Article XXVIII”. 
 
There are no rules governing what compensation may be negotiated between the parties. The 
initiating party, the EU is this case, should circulate statistical evidence on the imports by 
country of origin for the most recent three years, and preferably in quantities and values. This 
will determine the position of affected countries as having a ‘principal supplying interest’ or 
‘substantial supplying interest’. Paragraph 2 of the article states 
2. In such negotiations and agreement, which may include provision for compensatory adjustment with 
respect to other products, the contracting parties concerned shall endeavour to maintain a general level of 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in 
this Agreement prior to such negotiations. 
 
The aim of the negotiations should therefore be to have a trade relationship that is at least as 
good as before the negotiations. 
 
In the commentary article XXVIIIbis, the Agreement mentions 
 
3. Negotiations shall be conducted on a basis which affords adequate opportunity to take into account: 
(a) the needs of individual contracting parties and individual industries; 
(b) the needs of less-developed countries for a more flexible use of tariff protection to assist 
their economic development and the special needs of these countries to maintain tariffs for 
revenue purposes; and 
(c) all other relevant circumstances, including the fiscal, developmental, strategic and other 
needs of the contracting parties concerned. 
This brings into focus, apart from the needs of countries and industries, the issue of fiscal 
needs and revenues generated by the tariff. 
  
It appears therefore that important information for the negotiations should include the 
revenues for the EU that are generated by the present and new tariff schedule, while the 
supplying countries should provide evidence on the fiscal, developmental and strategic role of 
the employment and revenues generated by the production of the bananas. 
 
Although not applicable in this case, it is interesting to se what is said in case a quota is 
replacing a tariff and suggests that compensation should be based on an estimate of the trade 
forgone. The text is 
6. When an unlimited tariff concession is replaced by a tariff rate quota, the amount of compensation 
provided should exceed the amount of the trade actually affected by the modification of the concession. 
The basis for the calculation of compensation should be the amount by which future trade prospects 
exceed the level of the quota. It is understood that the calculation of future trade prospects should be 
based on the greater of: 
(a) the average annual trade in the most recent representative three-year period, increased by 
the average annual growth rate of imports in that same period, or by 10 per cent, whichever is 
the greater; or 
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(b) trade in the most recent year increased by 10 per cent. 
In no case shall a Member’s liability for compensation exceed that which would be entailed by complete 
withdrawal of the concession. 
 
 
This suggests that the compensation might be based on the estimated future trade that could 
have taken place had the trade measure (in the above case a quota) not been taken. If the EU, 
in the present case, were to consider a higher tariff to be imposed on non-ACP countries than 
what would be commensurate with the present tariff-quota, this would typically diminish 
prospects for future trade of these countries. This reduction of trade might then serve as a 
basis for compensation similar to what is indicated in paragraph 6 of the Understanding 
above. 
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3. Methodology of calculating the compensation 
 
In its move to change the CMOB from a system with tariff quota to a system with tariffs only, 
the EU actually opens up the market and – in principle – links the price within the EU to the 
world market price in the outside market. Though prices may be linked, there is a gap 
between the two prices, within and outside the EU, equal to the new tariff.  
At present (and again in principle), the price formation within the EU follows its own ‘laws’, 
and prices are such that demand for bananas within the EU equals supply, where supply is 
restrained by the quota and the levels of production within the EU. The ‘within-price’ is 
thereby de-linked from the world market price. Producing countries are affected by the quota, 
which reduces their trade. How high the prices within the European Union are is actually of 
minor importance for the producing countries, unless these prices have an effect on the prices 
paid to them.  
In this chapter we provide the theoretical considerations for determining the tariff equivalent 
of the quota. We distinguish between a ‘small country’ situation and, more appropriately, the 
case in which the changes in the EU have an effect on the world market.  
We proceed by looking into the adequate definition of the price. Should these be based on 
retail or wholesale prices in the EU, or CIF prices, or FOB prices? Do these prices accurately 
reflect the effect of tariff-quota or are they higher than could be expected on the basis of quota 
alone? We show how exchange rates influence these prices and conclude that the quota rents 
themselves are also sensitive to this exchange rate.  
We draw conclusions for the comparisons that should provide a fair idea of the tariff 
equivalents and the compensation under GATT regulation. 
 
3.1 Quotas and tariff equivalents for a ‘small’ importer 
 
We start from a situation with two suppliers, ACP and LA. Later we shall look at individual 
countries within these groups. We shall first look at how the change from tariff-quota to 
tariff-only will affect the two suppliers. We shall then, in section 3.2, investigate the effects 
the change may have on the world market prices, and – after a discussion of price 
transmission in section 3.3 – focus on the implications for an individual producing country, 
Colombia.  
 
At present, October 2004, the supply of bananas to the EU comes from three sources:  
 LA: a quota of 2 954 thousand tons, including the 300 thousand tons for the Accession 
Countries. A tariff of €75/ton applies. 
 ACP: 750 thousand tonnes. No tariff. 
 EU itself, where producers are supported up to a maximum of 854 thousand tons. 
 
For the analysis to be based on observed data referring to EU15, we take the position in 2003. 
At that time, the extra quota for the EU10 was not yet added. The quotas were: 
 LA: a quota of 2 654 thousand tons with a tariff of €75/ton. Over-quota imports face a 
tariff of €680/ton. 
 ACP: 750 thousand tonnes. No tariff for ACP origin. Over-quota imports from ACP 
origin face a tariff of €380/ton. 
 EU itself, where producers are supported up to a maximum of 854 thousand tons. 
 
The use of the quota for dollar bananas was around 100% in the last years, and the use of the 
ACP quota actually was 105% in 2003, but below 100% in the years before. Note that non-
traditional ACP countries, in particular Dominican Republic is included since 2002. 
We may reasonably assume therefore that the two quotas are filled, and that hardly any over-
quota imports occur. The balance of EU supply comes from the EU producers, who have 
always produced somewhat less (roughly 10% less) than the maximum that can be supported.  
The size of the price change following the change in supply is dictated by the sensitivity of 
demand for the price, and the sensitivity of EU supply for the current price. This latter 
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sensitivity, however, depends on how the price changes are reflected in the price facing the 
producers. The current transmission of market prices to the support prices to the farmers is 
very weak, and actually non-existent, as the support prices are based on a deficiency payment 
system with a reference price that is higher than the current market price. EU producers have 
a support price equal to approximately €630/tonne, which is considerably higher than the 
prices prevailing in the market (EU Court of Editors, 2002, para 28). 
The data are in Appendix D.  
The supply and demand schedules are therefore composed as follows: 
 
The impact on the price of any change in the quota, therefore, comes through the sensitivity 
of demand only. 
The next Figure 3.1 shows the world market price (provisionally kept fixed), adds the tariffs 
to be paid and increases the quota to see what happens if they are no longer binding. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 larger quota for LA, same production or quota for ACP+EU 
Price 
 
 
 
P0 
                       Tariff equivalent        
 
Pw 
 
     
 
                                                                                     S                         D 
 
                              QLA0                       QACP                        EU supply 
                               QLA1                             QACP                         EU supply 
 
 
In this Figure, we have increased the quota of LA and kept the ACP quota (or ACP 
production) fixed. The point where the quota is no longer binding coincides with the supply-
demand equilibrium within the EU at the level of the world market price Pw. To return to the 
old situation indicated by P0, a tariff equal to the distance between P0 and Pw is sufficient (still 
assuming fixed supply from ACP and EU). This then would be the tariff equivalent of the 
quota for the non-ACP countries. 
 
The assumption, underlying Figure 3.1 is that supply to the EU at the level of the world 
market price or above is unlimited. This assumption is maintained still for LA, but we now 
take supply responses within the ACP group into account. Increasing its quota will not lead to 
immediate increases in the supply, as is supply is sensitive to prices. 
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Figure 3.2: quota for LA, no quota for ACP 
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Figure 3.2 shows what happens, if QLA is maintained but QACP is abolished. Supply to the 
EU now results from the price-sensitive supply from ACP that is added to the (fixed) supply 
from LA and EU. As the ACP at the current prices would produce more than its present quota 
(i.e. the quota is binding), the equilibrium price in the EU will fall somewhat, as shown by the 
intersection of the supply and demand curve at a point P1 below the level of P0. Within the 
ACP group, the additional supply is likely to come from the African countries (Côte d'Ivoire 
and Cameroon in particular) and from the Dominican Republic and Belize. 
If the quota for LA were replaced by a tariff, the tariff should equal the difference between P1 
and P0. In this situation, however, supplies from the ACP might have increased relative to LA. 
As drawn in Figure 3.2, ACP supply at the lower price exceeds its original quota-restricted 
supply, but this depends on the supply elasticity. If ACP supply were more sensitive, a lower 
tariff for LA would restore the original market shares for the two blocks. 
 
3.2 World market impact 
 
Total EU-15 imports of around 3.2 million tons account for 27% of the world imports (FAO, 
2002, p. 10). Changes in EU import policy which affect EU import demand may have 
considerable effect on the world market price and hence on the supply from the major 
producing countries. 
 
The relevant (approximate) figures for the dollar zone market are: 
 LA exports: 9.5 million tons 
 USA imports: 4 million tons 
 EU-15 imports: 2.5 million tons 
 RoW imports from LA: 3 million tons 
 
An increase in import quota into the EU by 100 thousand tons, for example, would affect 
world market prices. It would typically shift the demand function by the increase in quota and 
the new equilibrium price would depend on the supply elasticity of LA and the demand 
elasticities in USA and elsewhere. 
 
The relevant formula is 
 
RRUSUSLA ss
DdQpd  
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Here p stands for the dollar-zone price and dlnp for its relative change, dQ for the shift in EU 
quota, D for total LA supply (which equals total LA demand) and sUS and sR are the shares of 
the USA and the Rest of the World in this demand. The ε’s indicate the elasticities of LA 
supply, US demand and Rest of the World demand.  
 
Taking as elasticities for LA supply 0.4, for US demand 0.3 and for RoW demand 0.3, the 
expression looks as follows: 
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That is, an increase in demand of 0.1 million tons or just over 1% of total LA supply would 
lead to an increase in the dollar-zone prices of 1.7%. 
 
The formula can also be used to indicate the effects of changes in a tariff. Suppose that the 
EU quota are replaced by a tariff, and that this tariff is equivalent to the quota, so that the 
same demand for LA bananas would result, and the same world market price for dollar 
bananas would prevail. Then, what would be the effect of a change in this tariff on the world 
market price? 
The answer can be obtained by translating the tariff change into an EU-demand change and 
then applying the above formula. To transform the tariff change into a demand change, we 
employ an EU demand elasticity of -0.5. 
For a given change in the tariff, the following formula may be instructive. We used the 
relationship for the EU price to be equal to the world market price times (1+t), where t is the 
tariff. For a relative change in this tariff dln(1+t), it holds that 
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At present this tariff is €75 per ton, with a value of around €650, or a tariff of about 11.5%. 
Suppose this would be reduced by €7.5, so that the tariff-factor (1+t) would fall by 1%. The 
effect then would be for world market price to rise 0.7%, and the EU-prices would eventually 
go down by only 0.3%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 3.1 Preliminary estimates of price impact of EU policy 
 
These changes in world market prices are therefore not negligible and should be taken into 
account when considering the consequences of a change of the Common Market Organisation 
for Bananas (CMOB). 
 
100 thousand tons higher 
quota for LA Bananas 
1 %-point lower tariff on LA 
bananas (EU+ACP supply 
kept fixed) 
World market price 1.7 % higher 
World market price 0.7% higher 
EU internal price 0.3% lower 
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Effects of changes in tariff and/or quota when LA supply responds 
 
Taking into account such changes in the world market price requires the inclusion of the net 
supply function of bananas from LA to the EU. This supply can be seen as the total 
production of LA minus demand from USA minus other demand. Obviously, its sensitivity to 
prices depends on the supply and demand elasticities in these regions. With the elasticities 
that we have taken into account above, the elasticity by which net supply to the EU responds 
to price changes is approximately 3. It is so high because an increase in price not only 
increases supply, but also decreases demand in the other regions. 
 
The graphical representation now changes as supply functions are drawn into the picture. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Quota and supply functions for LA, 
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In Figure 3.3 point A indicates the original equilibrium in the EU market. Supply by EU 
producers is fixed by the higher-than-the-market price offered to them, and supply from ACP 
and LA countries by the quota. Prices prevailing in the EU market are equal to P0. In order to 
keep net supply from LA to EU at the quota-restricted volume, prices in the world market 
should be Pw0, which can be obtained graphically by moving down from point A until the 
supply function including LA, is met.  
If, in this graph, the quota for LA were enlarged, an equilibrium price within the EU can be 
reached to the right of point A, where more supply from LA reaches the EU. In response the 
world market price would rise.  
When the quota would be lifted altogether, the intersection of the demand curve DD and the 
supply curve would determine EU and world market price. In this case the price would be 
Pw1.  
At this price Pw1, without further tariffs, supply from ACP would be only equal to the size of 
the double arrow, as shown in the graph, while supply from LA would be the distance from 
this arrow to the supply function. In order to maintain the original protection offered to the 
ACP countries, supply from LA can be discouraged by imposing a tariff on their imports into 
the EU. The graph shows the new equilibrium as point B. This point combines supply from 
ACP and LA in approximately the same proportions as before (as drawn, both increase a bit). 
The tariff that leads to this equilibrium is shown as the distance between the two parallel 
supply curves, TE.  
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The new equilibrium is reached at an EU price somewhat below the original P0, supplies from 
LA and from ACP increase slightly, while the world market price Pw, though a bit higher than 
the original Pw0, will remain below the tariff-free-market price of Pw1. 
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion from the theoretical exercise is that the classical tariff equivalent of the quota 
may be misleading. If supply of ACP and EU were kept fixed, the tariff equivalent of the 
present quota on LA supply to the EU market would apply. As ACP supplies are currently 
effectively bound by the C-quota in the CMOB, the actual tariff equivalent must be less. 
The change towards a quota-free system implies that not only the quota on LA supplies is 
lifted, but also that of ACP supplies. 
The proper way to address the issue of a tariff equivalent is to first construct what the impacts 
are of abolishing the ACP tariff, and then to calculate what remains as a tariff equivalent for 
LA imports. The relevant approach is therefore as indicated by Figure 3.2 and 3.3.  
 
 
3.3 What price to take? 
 
An important question is what price to take. While the theoretical model employs a ‘European 
price’ and a ‘world market price’, and assumes these to be closely linked in the way as shown 
above, the actual world knows many prices. Statistically speaking, the main sources of 
information are the export and import unit values relating to trade flows. Changes in the one 
are not automatically transmitted to the other (see Chapter 4), nor are changes in unit import 
values completely reflected in wholesale prices or retail prices. Yet, these latter prices 
determine demand sensitivity, which co-determines the level of tariff equivalent to the quota. 
And the unit import values are likely to be taken as important yardsticks for the calculation of 
the interest that producers have in changes of the EU import regime and in calculating any 
compensation. 
Of particular importance is how the transmission of such changes in prices anywhere in the 
supply chain of bananas is by itself influenced by the regime. Has the system of licenses, 
given to operators, led to oligopolistic structures in the market that pushed up the European 
prices more than can be explained by the tariff-quota itself? 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the picture is not the same within Europe. While in France and 
the UK, prices fell after the CMOB took off, those in Germany rose. The initial direction of 
change is obviously the result of their earlier positions. The change took quite some time, 
however. For the EU at large, the mere fact that supply is constrained should lead to higher 
prices.  
We will address two questions in this section. The first question is whether prices, notably 
retail prices, have gone up by more than could be explained by the supply restriction and 
import prices with additional tariffs alone. If so, this may point towards less than normal 
competition, which may, however, not survive the change envisaged in 2006. The second 
question is how the higher internal EU prices might be reflected in higher import prices and in 
higher prices for the exporters and producers in the protected region, the ACP producers. 
 
As to the first question of higher than normal price rises in the EU, Figure 2.1 showed that 
after the introduction of the CMOB, retail prices in France and to some extent in the UK 
actually fell, while those in Germany rose. To assess the latter rise in prices Figure 3.5 
presents a longer time series of retail prices, for EU countries and for the USA. Data were 
taken from the FAO Banana Statistics.  
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Figure 3.5 Retail prices ($/kg) in various countries 
 
The Figure 3.5 makes clear that, though some prices, especially in Germany, have gone up 
after the introduction of the CMOB, there is tendency for the retail prices in the EU to 
converge to one another and to come down to the level of retail prices in the USA. An 
important factor underlying the movements of the EU prices have been the exchange rates of 
the Euro-currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar. To explain this effect, we return to the formula 
used above for the impact of an EU demand change on the world market prices. 
The formula was  
 
 
RRUSUSLA ss
DdQpd  
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Here, dQ stood for the change in the dollar-zone quota in the EU, and D for the world demand 
for dollar-bananas. Consider now what shift in EU demand would occur following a change 
in the exchange rate.  
The standard demand function, disregarding other explanatory variable than the price, is  
 
 eupcd lnln    
 
Here, a suffix eu is added to indicate that it is the local price which is important. If all bananas 
would be imported from the dollar-zone, this local price is the product of the dollar-price and 
the exchange rate. Actually, about 65% come from this region. For imports from dollar-zone 
the formula can be written as 
 
 €xpcd $$ lnlnln    
 
Here the last term is the Euro-dollar exchange rate. 
A change in this exchange rate affects consumption just like a change in dollar-prices. Hence, 
if the exchange rate would go up by 1%, more euros are to be paid for one dollar, hence 
consumption will fall by ε, or 0.5% in our case. This does not affect all EU imports, but 
around 65% would be. Such an exogenous change would have repercussions for world market 
and EU prices. The 1% increase in exchange rate leads to 0.5% decrease in the demand for 
dollar-bananas, which have a share of 27% of the world market. As a consequence, world 
market prices would go down by 0.2%, while prices in euro would go up by (1.0-0.2=) 0.8%.  
Consider the position of a trader in this context. He buys bananas for dollars and sells these 
for euros. If the euro depreciates, prices in euros should go up if he must meet his 
commitments in dollars. But if these commitments are largely in euro-terms, there is less need 
to adjust the euro-price. If the competition of ACP bananas (not affected by this exchange 
rate) is strong, there are fewer possibilities to adjust the euro-price and, finally, the agreed 
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price for the bananas may even have been in euros rather than dollars. Theoretically, the 
equilibrium lies in between; this is what the formula tells us. In practice, there may be 
considerable time lags and rigidities in the euro-prices. The changes that are observed in the 
retail prices of Figure 3.5 might reflect exchange rate changes rather than actual changes. 
Figure 3.6 shows the unit import values into the EU, expressed both in US$ and in euros (or 
its forerunner the ECU). The graph makes clear that the swings noticed in the dollar prices in 
recent years are hardly reflected in the euro prices. The recorded unit imported values might, 
therefore, reflect demand side influences as much as supply side effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Import Unit Values of Bananas into the EU15 from Latin America, 
sources Comtrade, IMF 
 
In particular, the spectacular rise in import unit values between 1993 and 1995, which is 39% 
in US dollar terms, is ‘only’ 28% in euro terms, as the dollar depreciated by 9% against the 
European currencies.  
 
Comparison of Figures 3.5 and 3.6 makes clear that the changes that are recorded for the 
retail prices in Germany are also reflected in the unit import values. This is surprising because 
import values should normally reflect FOB values plus the margin for international trade 
only, and need not be affected by the currency or regime of the importing country. The fact 
that it is indicates that the import pricing of the bananas into the EU responds to the EU 
demand conditions, inclusive of the import regime. Given the dominance of multi-national 
companies in the banana trade, a relatively high degree of transfer pricing occurs in this field. 
The prices that are recorded for imports are often recorded for goods that do not change 
ownership upon importing. Hence, it is up to the importer, and the custom (and tax) officials 
to determine the correct price. Importers, especially the transnational companies, have a 
natural interest in having relatively high import prices, implying that any profits are not made 
within the EU but offshore in the maritime transport. The latter source of profits is likely to be 
taxable at lower rates than EU profits. 
 
Do import prices respond to regime changes? The analysis reported in chapter 4 shows that 
the margins between FOB prices and CIF prices in the EU are high by international standard, 
even when adjusted for longer transport distances. 
 
Of the two questions, asked at the beginning of the section, we have answered one 
definitively positive: do the higher prices, caused by the restricted supply in the European 
Union show up in the import prices? The above shows this. Though positive, the answer is 
not complete. The effects may also turn up in other stretches of the chain from producer to 
consumer. We return to this question below, after discussing the question of overshooting 
effects that the regime may have had and that are due to oligopolistic structure of the market 
that is created. 
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Oligopoly  
As mentioned at the start of section 2, the original reduction in supply caused by the CMOB 
was around 10% for the EU as a whole, but has affected Germany more and France less than 
this. Comparing 1995 with 1992, German consumption dropped by 12.6%, while EU15’s 
consumption fell by 10.9% and France’s consumption rose by 11.4%. On the basis of the 
average demand elasticity for the EU of -0.5, as employed earlier, a decrease in supply by 
12.6% would have led to a price increase of 25%. Actual retail price change in Germany in 
US$ was 36%, but in euros it was only 24%, approximately what could be expected on the 
basis of a demand elasticity of -0.5. If this elasticity would be higher, for example, Badinger’s 
(2002, p. 64) estimate of -1.08, the same supply reduction by 12.6% would require prices to 
rise by only 11.7%, much less than the observed increase in euro-prices in Germany. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that European Commission itself apparently accounts 
for reduced competition in the EU market due to the CMOB. In the calculation of possible 
effects of the 1999 proposals, the Commission submitted calculations to the Agrifin 
Committee of the European Union in which the effect of additional supply in 2000 was 
calculated. In these calculations, not just a price elasticity of demand of 0.6 is employed 
(somewhat higher than our estimate), but also a further price effect due to “increased 
competition” of no less than 5%. Appendix D provides the full text of the EC calculations at 
that time. 
 
Retail, wholesale and import prices 
 
Having established that import unit values are linked to the demand side, we proceed to 
answering the question on how close this link is. If it is fully representative, we have found a 
good basis to represent the effect of changes in the EU market on the prices, and can continue 
from there. 
To investigate the link, we look at the relationship between wholesale price in the EU and the 
import prices. As indicate above, the various EU countries have responded rather differently 
to the CMOB, with France and the UK seeing a reduction of the retail prices, and Germany 
witnessing a strong increase. Treating the EU as one country is clearly incorrect, but the 
restriction on imports introduced by the CMOB applied to this entity. As it restricted supply 
by more than before, prices had to go up, on average. We construct an average indicator of 
the wholesale prices by taking an average of four retail prices available, those for France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK. The weights we apply take consumption in the UK and Italy as 
weights for these variables (20% and 10% respectively), consumption in Portugal, Spain and 
France as the weight of the French wholesale price (30%), and take Germany to be 
representative of the “Rest of the EU15” (40%). Using the data partly shown in Figure 3.5, 
the EU retail price is as given in Figure 3.8, where it can be compared with what we may call 
the import price. 
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Figure 3.8 Import unit values and retail prices in the EU (€/kg) 
 
There is therefore a degree of correspondence between import unit values and the retail prices 
within Europe that is not caused by changes in the supply prices. Obviously, such relationship 
should hold even more strongly for the relationship between retail prices and prices at the 
wholesale level. A statistical source close to the import unit values, and representative of the 
wholesale level is the intra-European price. This import unit value for intra-European trade, 
published by Eurostat, provides a basis for the wholesale prices in which trade taxes and the 
effects of quotas are incorporated. The following Figure 3.9 adds this intra EU import unit 
value to the graph above, showing the closer correlation between the latter and the retail 
prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Retail prices and import unit values in the EU (€/kg) 
 
The introduction of the CMOB in 1993 has led to a change in the flows through which 
bananas enter into the wholesale distribution. While intra-EU trade was of minor importance 
before 1994, it grew in importance rapidly after the common regime was installed. Thus, 
France saw the share of intra-EU trade increase from 1% in 1990 to 24% in 1995, for the UK 
this share increased from 12% to 22% and Germany recorded an enormous change from 1% 
in 1990 to 50% in 1995. A much larger share of bananas now reaches the consumer via other 
countries, notably via the port of Antwerp in Belgium. The average import unit values of each 
of the EU countries are affected by this diversion of trade channels. Whereas import unit 
values used to refer to the extra-EU import unit values, it now incorporates the intra-EU 
prices too, and these latter prices are inclusive of the tariff and any quota rents. 
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Figure 3.9 shows that the margin between the intra-EU price and the extra-EU import unit 
value has widened considerably after introduction of the CMOB. This too is a reflection of 
the tariff and quota rents that have varied over the period. 
 
Distribution of quota rents of the effects over intra and extra EU import prices 
The question now poses itself as to how the two effects of the introduction of the CMOB, on 
the wholesale prices and on the extra-EU import prices relate to one another. Is it possible to 
distinguish how much of the tariff and quota rent show up in the margin between FOB and 
CIF or in the margin between CIF and wholesale?  
Figure 3.10 below indicates the values of the margin between the FOB price in Latin America 
and the intra-EU trade price, as representative of the wholesale prices within the EU-15, split 
into the first stage FOB-CIF and the second stage between the import unit values extra EU 
and those intra-EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 International and domestic margins 
in banana trade from dollar countries to EU-15 
 
In Figure 3.11, we take the years 1990-1993 as the basis, and see what changes in the 
international and EU margins have occurred since then. Thus, Figure 3.11 presents the 
deviations between the observed margins and those prevailing before 1994. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Changes in international and domestic margins, 
in banana trade from dollar countries to EU-15 compared with 1990-1993 
 
 
The margins, both between FOB and CIF and between the latter an the internal market have 
clearly increased. On average, the change over the period 1994-2001 is 8 eurocents for both 
margins (leaving 2002 outside, as trade data are still unreliable for this year). The Figure also 
shows how increases in one margin are partly compensated by decreases in another. In 1999, 
in particular, import unit values of extra-EU trade in Germany went up by 14 eurocents per 
kg, without significant changes in FOB-prices or wholesale prices. 
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On average, 16 eurocents per kg have been added to the margin between FOB Latin America 
and wholesale prices within the EU, represented by the intra-EU import unit values. 
Of these 16 cents, 8 cents are incorporated into the domestic margin, and 8 cents therefore in 
the international (i.e. outside EU) margin. The tariff of 7.5 cents forms part of the margin, and 
is included in the second stage, after import. Hence not much room is left at this second stage 
for any quota rent. The change in the first stage, therefore, reflects the quota rent. If the 
figures for 2002 are indicative, this part has increased further in 2002. 
  
 
Conclusion on prices 
 
The conclusion of the analysis as to ‘what price’ to use, is base on two considerations. One is 
that theory tells us that an effective quota must lead to a wider margin between the price to 
the supplier and the price faced by the consumer. The above analysis shows that the quota 
rent and the tariff are visible in the wider margin between FOB prices for Latin American 
producers and intra-EU prices. To a large extent, the quota rent is located in the international 
FOB-CIF margin.  
This implies that the import unit values of the EU are themselves sensitive to the quota and 
cannot be used to represent the prices without quota and tariff. 
 
CMOB and trade 
The introduction of the CMOB in 1993 has pushed retail prices up, as predicted by theory. 
This was particularly well visible in Germany. In France and the UK, however, retail prices 
actually came down, and this reflects the different starting points and the way in which import 
licenses were distributed. The large share of licenses distributed to firms that traditionally 
imported into these countries meant that bananas became more easily available in these 
markets than in the past. The distribution of bananas over the EU countries has not responded 
smoothly to the one-market idea underlying the market organisation. Seven years after the 
introduction the market share of ACP bananas in Germany’s imports has only risen to some 
10%, while in France, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon still hold a share of more than 70% 
(UNCTAD, 2003, pp. 66-67).  However, retail prices in the major EU countries have 
converged substantially since 1993, as shown by Figure 3.5. 
The import unit values recorded in the statistics have also responded to the CMOB and reflect 
demand conditions rather than the traditional FOB-prices plus cost, insurance and freight.  
Another potential reason to use the import unit values as a measure of the relevant price is 
related to the definition of trade value. The GATT text mentions that an agreement should be 
sought which is ‘no less favourable to trade’. Traded quantities are by their nature the 
outcome of the confrontation of demand in the EU and supply from the parties concerned and 
other suppliers. Tariffs, exchange rates and other financial measures affect both quantities and 
prices of trade. It is the value of the trade that is a relevant measure on which talks should be 
based. 
 
There are two ways to measure the value of trade of the exporting countries to the EU. One is 
based on the FOB prices of the exporting countries; one is based on the recorded CIF import 
prices into the EU. Of these two, the more reliable one is the second approach, as only at the 
point of import into the EU the actual origin is recorded, whereas the eventual destination of 
the exports from the exporting countries cannot be accurate at the time the goods leave the 
country. 
This would imply that all the effects of European import regime and European demand 
conditions on the import prices into the EU, which we have shown above, are counted as part 
of the trade value.  
These import unit values do not move in line with FOB prices, however, and one might argue 
that FOB prices are the prices accruing to producing countries, whereas the difference 
between import prices and export prices accrues to trading companies. An obvious mixture of 
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the two approaches would be to use the quantities imported as measured by Eurostat, and 
FOB prices taken from the export statistics of the producing countries. 
 
 
3.4 Quota rents on ACP trade 
 
The initial levels of ACP quotas and the distribution of licenses were made in a way so as to 
safeguard the access of bananas from ACP countries into the EU. To prevent strong 
competition among the ACP countries, country allocations of the quota were put in place in 
1993. Major recipients were Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, who received 18% of total ACP 
quota each, and St Lucia and Jamaica with 15% and 12%, respectively. Later adjustments 
brought larger quota to the African producers (each 7500 tons extra), but in 1999 the country 
allocations were abolished.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Imports from Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroun 
into EU-15, and quota (tons) 
 
For the two African producers, these quotas have been binding, as shown in Figure 3.11. 
Throughout the period, even before 1994, both countries enjoyed privileged access into 
France. Yet, FOB prices did not show such high levels. After the introduction of the CMOB, 
FOB prices rose. This amounted to an enormous real increase in prices in francs CFA after 
the devaluation by 50% of this currency vis-à-vis the French franc in January 1994. Not until 
1997 did FOB prices started to fall in euro-terms (see Figure 3.12). FOB prices kept declining 
since then, in spite of import unit values into France, that hovered between 50 and 60 euro 
cent per kg. In particular, in the years until 1999, the binding quotas should have led to 
considerable quota-rents. These did not show up in the FOB prices, however, but they appear 
to do so in the unit import values. These fell in 1999 but increased again in 2001. This may 
again be a reflection of the constraints on access into the EU. Even though the ACP country 
allocations were abolished, licenses were still needed. These were distributed to operators on 
the basis of historical performance, and did not accommodate large increases in production 
such as from the two African countries (and Belize and the Dominican Republic). Thus either 
the operators with licenses had to establish themselves as trading partners for Ivorian and 
Cameroon producers, or the traditional operators without enough licenses had to buy these. 
This process widens the gap between producer and consumer prices, and effectively widens 
the margin between FOB and import unit values. 
Thus, the margin between EU import price and African FOB price in 2002 was back at the 
level of 1992, again 33 cents. This margin must be considerably higher than the transport 
costs, as the margin has been as low as 22 cents and 20 cents in 1995 and 1996.  
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Figure 3.12 prices FOB African ACP countries and 
import unit values from Africa into France 
 
If quota on ACP imports were abolished, there is no longer a need to buy licenses to import, 
and this would reduce the margin by some 10-15 cents. In the simulation of Chapter 4 we 
shall employ 10 cents as a modest estimate. 
In the above discussion, we did not distinguish between rents and/or tariffs that may show up 
at the wholesale level. One reason is that a sufficiently long time series was unavailable, but a 
major reason is the narrow relationship between the import unit values in France and the retail 
prices, as shown in Figure 3.13. The orange squares show the data points before 1994. 
Apparently, the relationship is close, without major breaks before and after the introduction of 
the CMOB in 1994: prices both FOB and at the import level were lower, but following the 
same pattern still. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13 Relationship between retail prices and import unit values 
from ACP-Africa into France (€/kg) [orange squares refer to pre-1994 years] 
 
 
This analysis of the relationships between ACP-Africa and EU, and France in particular, has 
led to the result that the margin between FOB and CIF Europe is affected by the banana 
policy of the EU and the quota regulation itself. In particular, there is reason to believe that 
considerable quota rents are incorporated into these margins.  
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3.5 Application to the change from tariff-quota to tariffs only 
 
The first step in comparing the situation with and without quotas is to make the comparison 
between countries facing different quotas and tariffs at the moment. This we shall do first for 
the aggregate of the ACP countries and the aggregate of the dollar-zone producers. We then 
look at the case of individual countries, including Colombia.  
In the comparison of import unit values (resembling ‘CIF-prices’) and unit export 
values (proxy for ‘FOB-prices’) we take the data of Eurostat to calculate the former, and data 
from the FAO for the latter. Figure 3.14 and 3.15 show the results. The whole of the dollar 
zone producers experienced lower CIF prices (until very recently), substantially lower FOB 
prices, but higher margins between the CIF and FOB prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14 CIF-EU and FOB prices,               Figure 3.15 Margin between CIF-EU and 
dollar zone and ACP countries(€/kg)               FOB prices, dollar and ACP countries (€/kg) 
 
 
The lower CIF prices can be attributed to the extra tariff that must be paid upon entry into the 
EU, and (potentially) to the quota rent. As to the former, the average difference between the 
CIF prices from the two zones over the period 1994-2003 was 5 euro cent per kg, which is 
less than the €0.075/kg of the tariff. Hence no room is left for any difference in quota rent to 
become visible in the CIF prices. The sudden rise in the CIF prices of dollar zone producers 
in 1994 suggests, however, that some of the rents are reflected in the higher CIF prices at that 
time.  
FOB prices of dollar producers are consistently below those of the ACP countries, on average 
13 euro cents lower, reflecting lower production costs and the minor share that the EU has in 
all the exports of the dollar zone producers. ACP countries export to EU almost exclusively. 
When dollar zone producers do, the margin between CIF and FOB is, on average over 1994-
2002, 8 euro cents higher. This is the same difference that we found earlier for the effect of 
the CMOB on the margin between FOB and CIF. Then, the analysis was based on the 
differences over time, now the outcome is derived from the comparison of two producers. 
   
The distribution of this tariff over the CIF-price and the FOB-price is reassuringly in line with 
the theory. As indicated earlier (above chart 3.1), a tariff-increase by 1% of the world market 
price leads to EU-price being higher by about 0.3 % and world market prices being lower by 
0.7%. Thus most of the effect would go to the world market price. The data underlying 
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 distribute the 8 cents over CIF-price and FOB-price in proportions that 
suggest stronger supply response than the 0.4 elasticity we had: , -3 cents for FOB-price, +5 
cents for CIF-price.  
 
Concluding, we are able to say that the effects of the tariff-quota on the producers can be 
traced through the changes in the import unit values and the export unit values of the 
countries concerned. The quota rents show up in the levels of the margins between import 
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unit values and export unit values, while the tariff is seen in the difference of the margins 
between countries affected by the tariff and those that are not. 
 
Distinction within the ACP countries 
 
The ACP countries that were aggregated in the last section, are now grouped in to the African 
producers (dominated by Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon), and the ACP producers from the 
Caribbean, also including Belize and Surinam. The table 3.1 below indicates the average CIF 
prices, FOB prices and margins between the two for the separate groups, with the dollar-
banana producers also given for comparison. 
 
Table 3.1 CIF prices, FOB prices and margins (€/kg) 
  1994-1998 1999-2002 
  CIF prices  
dollar zone 0.52 0.58 
ACP Africa  0.58 0.59 
ACP Caribbean 0.60 0.68 
  FOB prices 
dollar zone  0.24 0.28 
ACP Africa  0.30 0.27 
ACP Caribbean 0.38 0.48 
  CIF-FOB Margins 
dollar zone  0.29 0.30 
ACP Africa  0.27 0.32 
ACP Caribbean 0.23 0.20 
 
Whereas the margins for the Latin American producers have remained steady over the period 
of the CMOB, margins for the African producers have increased and those for the Caribbean 
group have decreased. At the same time, FOB prices from Africa have fallen, while those 
from the Caribbean rose substantially. This suggests that the attractiveness of importing form 
African ACP counties must have increased and that higher rents are earned by importing from 
these regions, while imports from ACP Caribbean as a whole have become more expensive 
and less attractive to the importers. The low margins of around 20 cents indicate that in the 
shipments from the Caribbean no or hardly any rents are incorporated and that – if rents exist 
– these are transmitted to producers. The high FOB prices for the Caribbean producers are 
indications of their high marginal production costs; their African colleagues are able to 
produce cheaper, but this is not reflected in the European prices due to rents on the quota for 
ACP producers, and the distribution over operators. Apparently, even though the ACP quotas 
were not fully used until recently, African producers had difficulties in finding importers in 
possession of import licenses and were charged accordingly. 
 
 
The position of Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Côte d'Ivoire  
Colombia, as the third exporter of bananas from Latin America, holds around 23% of the 
imports from the dollar zone into the EU. We now check if the changes for the aggregates 
also apply to individual countries. 
The Figures 3.16 and 3.17 below show the prices for three major banana-producing countries, 
each from a different zone. Côte d'Ivoire as a beneficiary of the CMOB for ACP countries; 
the Dominican Republic which was initially among the non-traditional ACP countries, 
benefiting from the tariff preference, but – until 1999 – competing for licenses with Latin-
American countries; and Colombia as a major dollar-zone exporter. 
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Figure 3.16 CIF and FOB prices for three countries 
 
Comparing the years before 1993 with those more recent, there is clear convergence of import 
unit values immediately after 1993, whereas the FOB prices converge only gradually. It is 
also clear that they reach near-equality in 20014. For three countries from a different import 
regime, and facing different tariffs (€ 0.075/kg for Colombia, 0 for the other) to be paid upon 
entry into the EU, this is remarkable.  
The difference between CIF and FOB prices reflects the attractiveness of shipping goods from 
a country to the EU. Figure 3.17 shows the evolution of the CIF-FOB margins over time for 
the three countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17 Margins between CIF EU and FOB in €/kg 
 
As Figure 3.17 shows, the margins between CIF and FOB have also converged. It used to be 
very attractive to spend euros on purchasing bananas in the Dominican Republic and 
importing these into the EU, but the advantage seems to have faded as of 1999. In the period 
1999-2001, the mean difference of the margins of Colombia and the Dominican Republic was 
just over 4 euro cents, against 14 euro cents in the years before 1999. Between 1995 and 
1999, the Dominican Republic had a quota of 55000 tons, which was initially exceeded, but 
later not fully used. After 1999, its exports to the EU expanded strongly. 
 
Comparison of Colombia with another major supplier to the EU outside the dollar zone, 
apparently does not help in showing what tariff might be equivalent to the quotas imposed on 
the dollar zone producers. 
                                                          
4 Equal FOB prices in euros do not, however, have the same effect for each country. Côte d'Ivoire, for 
example, experienced a 50% devaluation of its currency in 1994, so that the observed steady level of 
FOB prices actually amounted to a strong real incentive to production. 
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The conclusion of this exercise must be that individual countries, such as Colombia and Côte 
d'Ivoire, do not individually display the effects of market regimes in the prices. The 
heterogeneity of the product and the services provided in shipping the goods, are such that 
prices can differ consistently from one country to the other. This precludes drawing 
conclusions from country comparisons. 
The adequate comparison, therefore, is between the aggregates of the dollar zone producers, 
and the ACP producers. Individual countries can be assumed to experience changes in their 
CIF and FOB prices, proportional to the changes that are imputed to the aggregates. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 3 started with a theoretical explanation of the effects that removal of quotas and 
changes in tariffs would have on the prices in the world market, and in the EU. We showed 
that taking into account what changes would occur in the possibilities for the ACP countries 
had an effect on the appropriate calculations of the equivalent tariff for Latin American 
countries. As supply from ACP countries, notably Africa, may expand under the new system, 
a lower tariff equivalent results for the Latin American producers. 
We have also shown that the likely size of the quota rent, on average over the period, is in the 
order of 8 cents. This resulted from a comparison over time, where we looked at the data on 
the price margins between intra-EU trade and extra-EU trade, and between import unit values 
from Latin America and their export unit values in 1990-1993 and compared this with the 
situation after 1993. We showed that both margins had increased with 8 cents. 
Likewise we compared the international margins for Latin America with those for the ACP 
countries as a whole, and concluded that, again, the price gap between the two margins came 
out at 8 cents, with Latin America having the larger margin. We see this as evidence for 
quota-rent being incorporated into the international trading costs. This view was confirmed in 
interviews with people knowledgeable in banana trade. 
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Chapter 4 Modeling for simulation 
 
4.1 Estimating supply and demand elasticities 
 
In this section we present estimation of supply and demand elasticities. Specifically we are 
interested in the response of producers and exporters in producing countries, and the response 
of consumers and importers in consuming countries. This information will serve as empirical 
foundation of the parameters in the partial equilibrium model, which will be constructed to 
simulate the impact of different tariff scenarios. In order to quantify the supply and demand 
response we estimate simple supply and demand equations. We make use of two major data 
sources, namely FAO STAT (production, area, yield, exports and imports of bananas (the 
latter two in quantities (metric tonnes) and values (x1000 US$))5 and the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (exchange rates, consumer price indices, gross domestic income, 
population). The FAO data start in 1961 and extend up to 2003 for production and 2002 for 
export and import. The data are collected for a selection of around 25 of the most important 
producing and consuming countries. A full account of the data used in the estimations, along 
with the explanation of the variables of the estimated equations, is given in Table 1. A listing 
of the countries selected comes along with the tables with estimation results. 
 
Table 4.1 Explanation of variables, transformation of variables and data-sources 
All variables are annual variables, and vary by country (j) and year(t) 
Q  Production of bananas, thousand tons (FAO STAT) 
REUVLC Real export unit value in local currency units:  
REUVLC=EUV.ER / CPI 
ER  Exchange rate: local currency unit per US$ (IFS, IMF) 
CPI  Consumer price index  (IFS, IMF) 
EUV  Export unit value in US$: EUV = XV / XQ 
XV  Exports of bananas, values, x 1000 US$ (FAO STAT) 
XQ  Exports of bananas, quantities, x 1000 tonne (FAO STAT) 
RIUVLC  Real import unit value in local currency units:  
RIUVLC=IUV.ER / CPI 
IUV  Import unit value in US$: IUV = MV / MQ 
MV  Imports of bananas, values, x 1000 US$ (FAO STAT) 
MQ  Imports of bananas, quantities, x 1000 tonne (FAO STAT) 
C  Consumption of bananas, thousand tons:  
producers: C = Q + MQ - XQ 
non-producers: C = MQ - XQ 
GDIPC  Per capita gross domestic income in constant prices:  
GDIPC = GDI / POP 
GDI  Gross domestic income in constant prices (IFS, IMF) 
POP  Population (IFS, IMF) 
 
In order to estimate supply response, we have estimated the response of production and export 
on prices. Prices are obtained by calculating export unit values, i.e. exports in value divide by 
exports in quantity. The US$ export unit values are converted to local currency units since 
producers and exporters will evaluate revenues in terms of local purchasing power. Further, in 
order to make prices comparable over time we have deflated the local currency export unit 
value with the country-specific consumer price index. 
Equations are estimated using an error correction framework, both in a two-stage 
formulation as well as a formulation where equilibrium and adjustment equations are 
combined. The following specification (combined formulation) is estimated for production: 
                                                          
5 The FAO data on import and export do not allow a complete identification of bilateral trade flows, i.e. 
a full account of exports by country of destination and imports by country of origin. For the purpose of 
estimating supply and demand responses such bilateral data are not needed. However, in order to 
analyse margins, the difference between FOB (export unit values) and CIF prices (import unit values) 
we do need bilateral trade data. Also to obtain insight in the geographical distribution of trade, bilateral 
trade data are indispensable. Bilateral trade data, obtained from COMTRADE (UNCTAD), are 
discussed and margins are investigated in the following section. 
 41
 
jtjtjt
jtjtjtjt
t41jt31jt2jt10jt
XQ/XVEUV
CPI/ER*EUVREUVLC
where
TRENDREUVLClnQlnREUVLClnQln


 
 
 
The two-stage variant of this equation is  
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The trend variable in the long run equation is included to control for a variety of determinants 
like change in productivity, improvements in production, marketing and export institutions, 
improved statistical registration of historical data. The trend variable takes on the value of 1 
in 1961 and increments 1 each year.  
We have evaluated the estimation results on econometric grounds, by looking at the 
significance of coefficients and the overall goodness of fit of the equation. Outliers have been 
omitted from estimation. On top of the econometric evaluation we have evaluated the 
estimation results in terms of their economic plausibility: we expect a positive coefficient on 
prices and the coefficient reflecting the adjustment towards the long run equilibrium (α2) 
should have a value between 0 and –1. Trend developments could be either negative or 
positive. A number of estimation results that are acceptable on econometric grounds have 
been rejected on economic grounds. 
 
The estimation of export response to prices is specified analogously:  
  
t41jt31jt2jt10jt TRENDREUVLClnXQlnREUVLClnXQln    
 
and this equation has the following two-stage variant:  
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In order to estimate demand response, we have estimated the response of 
consumption and import on prices and on per capita gross domestic income. Consumption of 
bananas by importing countries is constructed by subtracting re-exports from imports, while 
consumption of bananas by exporting countries is constructed by subtracting re-exports from 
domestic production and imports. Prices are obtained by calculating import unit values, i.e. 
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imports in value divide by imports in quantity. The US$ import unit values are converted to 
local currency units since consumers and importers will evaluate cost of consumption in terms 
of local purchasing power. Further, in order to make prices comparable over time we have 
deflated the local currency import unit value with the country-specific consumer price index. 
Series on gross domestic income in local currency units and constant prices are obtained 
directly from IFS, IMF and converted to per capita values. 
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Likewise, we may write the above equation in a two stage formulation: 
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Again, we have evaluated the estimation results, on the one hand, on econometric 
grounds by looking at the significance of coefficients and the overall goodness of fit of the 
equation and, on the other hand, on economic grounds. On economic grounds we expect 
consumers to react negatively on prices and positive on income. Long run income elasticities 
are at the highest around one, but preferably somewhat lower. We have some reservations 
about estimation results indicating income elasticities that are substantially above 1, 
especially in high-income countries. Again, the coefficient reflecting the adjustment towards 
the long run equilibrium is required to have a value between 0 and –1. Trend developments 
could be either negative or positive. Potential multi-collinearity between the trend variable 
and the income variable may seriously disturb the estimated coefficients. Variables that 
generate highly insignificant coefficients have been omitted from the estimated equation. It is, 
however, difficult to identify a priori if, and in what combination prices and income have a 
short run or long run impact of consumption. 
 We have estimated import equations entirely analogous to the consumption equation, 
using the identical explanatory variables, and applying the same error correction framework. 
 
Next we come to the presentation of the estimation results. The supply and demand equations 
are estimated for a selection of around 25 of the most important producing and consuming 
countries. All equations are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), except for the 
equations of Table 4.5, which are estimated with Instrumented Variables (IV). The estimation 
results are reported in Table 2 to 6. All tables report elasticities, either with respect to price 
(all tables) or with respect to price and income (only in case of consumption and import, 
Table 5 and 6). All reported elasticities are statistically significant at the 5% level.  
In order to obtain significant coefficients we have put some effort in searching for a 
subset of observations that appeared well behaved in terms of economic theory. In model 
selection the significance of the driving variables – price and income – is given more 
importance than goodness of fit. As a result of this procedure the estimated equation may be 
restricted to observations of a limited period and, hence, not reflect all, and possibly recent, 
developments and it may not capture structural breaks in the data, possibly related to regime 
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changes. Extensive diagnostic statistics are not reported, but may be supplied from the authors 
if required.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Supply elasticities of selected countries 
Elasticities of production with respect to price, estimated on the basis of FAO & IMF data 
Producing countries 2 stage  Combined 
European producers  Short run long run Short run long run 
 Guadeloupe EU  0.290 0.188 0.408 
 Martinique  EU 0.188 0.169  0.283 
 Portugal Madeira EU     
 Spain Canarians EU 1.011 1.034 0.988 0.986 
 Greece Crete EU 0.332 1.238 0.491 1.338 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries     
 Belize  ACP     
 Dominican Rep. ACP 0.125 0.170 0.111 0.111 
 Cape Verde ACP 0.470 0.771   
 Dominica  ACP 0.371 1.044 0.484 2.100 
 Grenada  ACP 0.334 0.823 0.452 1.621 
 Jamaica  ACP  0.380   
 Saint Lucia ACP  0.634   
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ACP  1.480 1.176 1.634 
 Suriname  ACP     
 Côte d'Ivoire ACP 0.374 0.401 0.427 0.284 
 Cameroon  ACP 0.084 0.169 0.076 0.354 
 Ghana  ACP   0.248 0.358 
US $ countries      
 Brazil  US$     
 Colombia  US$  0.181   
 Costa Rica  US$  0.530   
 Ecuador  US$ 0.294 0.260 0.332 0.665 
 Guatemala  US$     
 Honduras  US$ 0.240 0.246  0.607 
 Mexico  US$ 0.163 0.139 0.075 0.366 
 Nicaragua  US$     
 Panama  US$ 0.597 1.483 0.696 1.938 
Asian producers      
 China  AS 0.358 0.302 0.318 0.381 
 Malaysia  AS 0.038 0.201   
 Philippines  AS 0.229 0.582   
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Table 4.3 Supply elasticities of selected countries 
Elasticities of exports with respect to price, estimated on the basis of FAO & IMF data 
Producing countries 2 stage  Combined 
European producers  Short run Long run Short run long run 
 Guadeloupe EU 0.441 0.333 0.444 0.317 
 Martinique EU 0.260 0.221 0.233 0.243 
 Portugal Madeira EU     
 Spain Canarian Islands EU     
 Greece Crete EU     
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries     
 Belize  ACP  0.209   
 Dominican Rep. ACP  2.217   
 Cape Verde ACP     
 Dominica ACP 0.218 0.942 0.380 2.321 
 Grenada ACP 0.969 1.754 0.967 1.369 
 Jamaica ACP 0.318 0.780 0.341 1.1924 
 Saint Lucia ACP 0.706 1.075 0.958 2.221 
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ACP 1.567 1.761 1.645 1.884 
 Suriname ACP     
 Côte d'Ivoire ACP 0.600 0.555 0.564 0.440 
 Cameroon ACP 0.240 0.519 0.225 0.473 
 Ghana  ACP 1.009 0.579 - 1.553 
US $ countries       
 Brazil  US$  0.079   
 Colombia US$  0.270   
 Costa Rica US$ 0.274 1.242 0.515 1.638 
 Ecuador US$ 0.368 0.315 0.407 - 
 Guatemala US$     
 Honduras US$ 0.421 0.489 0.450 0.623 
 Mexico  US$ 0.914 1.097 0.955 1.451 
 Nicaragua US$ 0.163 0.466 0.269 0.782 
 Panama US$ 0.346 1.105 0.364 1.162 
Asian producers     
 China  AS 0.524 - 0.253 - 
 Malaysia AS 0.427 - 0.221 - 
 Philippines AS  0.321   
 
In general we have estimated supply elasticities with export unit values and demand 
elasticities with import unit values, both because these are considered the most relevant price 
variables (and since superior price data could not be obtained easily). There is one exception 
to this rule. Since European producers do not export the calculation of the export unit value is 
impossible for these producers. We have resolved this by using the import unit values in these 
cases, since we believe that these import unit values are a reasonable proxy for the relevant 
price. The use of import unit values in the estimation of production response is only applied in 
the case of Portugal (Madeira), Spain (Canarian Islands), and Greece (Crete): for Guadeloupe 
and Martinique we do have export unit values.   
 
Estimation of supply response is allowed under the condition that all the explanatory variables 
are exogenous, implying that they are not influenced by the supply response that is estimated. 
This is a reasonable assumption if countries are small producers and export a small quantity to 
the international market. These countries are simply to small to have an impact on prices. For 
larger producers, however, this assumption does not hold: their production and export 
decisions do influence prices. For this reason we instrument the price variable by estimating a 
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price equation and using the predicted value of the price equation in the supply response 
equation. 
 
For this purpose we have estimated a price equation for each country, using lagged values, the 
exchange rateand the consumer price index as explanatory variables. The predicted value of 
this price equation is used as an instrument for price. Re-estimation of the supply responses 
generates the estimation output presented in Table 4.4. The most striking result of this 
exercise is that long run price elasticities (combined estimation) move to a unit value for both 
Colombia and Costa Rica6. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Supply elasticities of large players in the market (instrumental variables estimation) 
Elasticities of exports with respect to price, estimated on the basis of FAO & IMF data 
Producing / exporting countries 2 stage  Combined 
US $ countries  Short run Long run Short run Long run 
 Colombia  US$ - 0.343 - 1.066 
 Costa Rica  US$ - 0.924 - 0.933 
 Ecuador  US$  0.189 0.331 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Results for Ecuador are statistically poor. 
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TABLE 4.5 Demand elasticities of selected countries 
Elasticities of consumption with respect to price and income,  
Estimated on the basis of  FAO & IMF data 
Consuming countries 2 stage  Combined  2 stage  Combin
ed 
 
EU12  Short 
run 
long run short 
run 
Long  
Run 
Short 
run 
long run short 
run 
Long 
run 
   France EU12  - - -   0.218 - 0.177 
   Greece EU12          
   Portugal EU12 -0.264 -0.375 -0.151 -0.403  0.928 0.992 0.895 0.832 
   Spain EU12 -0.134 - -0.134 -  2.260 0.486 2.242 0.453 
            
   Italy EU12 - -0.642 -0.164 -0.290  1.456 0.581 2.031 0.595 
   United 
   Kingdom 
EU12  -0.514 -0.104 -   0.712 - 2.997 
            
   Belgium EU12 -0.558 -0.998 -0.623 -  1.925 0.932 1.860 0.835 
   Denmark EU12 -0.443 -0.237 -0.386 -  1.991 0.476 1.591 0.825 
   Ireland EU12 -0.746 -0.749 -0.608 -0.389  1.427 0.423 1.847 0.327 
   Netherlands EU12 -0.570 -0.335 -0.561 -0.241  1.623 0.430 1.949 0.599 
            
   Germany EU12 -0.295 -0.562 -0.344 -  1.998 0.897 2.317 1.042 
EU15           
   Austria EU15 -0.265 -0.608 -0.224 -  1.458 0.393 1.696 1.027 
   Finland EU15 -0.318 -0.657 -0.343 -0.803  1.460 1.470 1.261 1.198 
   Sweden EU15 -0.188 -0.366 -0.152 -0.324  1.061 1.545 1.547 3.162 
EU25           
   Hungary EU25 -0.564 -0.720    2.271 1.088   
   Latvia EU25 -0.432 -0.869 -0.389 -1.028  2.101 1.432 1.278 1.261 
   Lithuania EU25          
   Malta EU25 -0.670 -0.905 -0.945 -1.268  - 0.622 - 0.614 
   Poland EU25          
   Cyprus EU25          
Non EU European countries         
   Romania NEU          
   Norway NEU -0.212 -0.465 -0.157 -  - 0.356 - 0.667 
   Switzerland NEU -0.078 -0.147 -0.086 -  1.047 0.827 0.626 0.532 
North, Central and Latin America        
   Canada NA -0.513 -0.673 -0.582 -0.713  - 0.770 - 0.772 
   USA NA -0.084 -0.114 -0.211 -  0.947 1.308 0.618 1.467 
   Argentina LA -0.143 -0.099 -0.234 -  1.334 1.752 1.469 1.439 
   Chile LA -0.184 -0.149 -0.415 -  1.312 1.564 1.419 1.358 
Asia           
   Japan AS -0.318 -0.241 -0.196 -  1.571 0.299 1.540 0.500 
   China AS -0.205 -0.806 -0.134 -  1.781 2.308 0.853 1.100 
   Korea AS -1.211 -0.850 -0.722 -0.274  4.150 2.254 2.364 2.364 
Oceania           
  Australia  -0.102 -0.156 -0.075 -  1.380 1.001 1.244 1.500 
  New Zealand OC -0.420 -0.741 -0.479 -0.545  1.975 1.591 2.859 2.030 
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Table 4.6 Demand elasticities of selected countries 
Elasticities of imports with respect to price and income, 
Estimated on the basis of  FAO & IMF data 
Consuming countries 2 stage  Combined  2 stage  Combin
ed 
 
EU12  short 
run 
Long 
run 
short 
run 
long  
run 
Short 
run 
long run short 
run 
long run
   France EU12 - -0.265 - -0.391  - 0.261 - 0.293 
   Greece * EU12          
   Portugal EU12 -0.644 -1.149        
   Spain ** EU12          
            
   Italy EU12 -0.359 -0.569 -0.286 -0.470  3.173 0.838 - 0.821 
   United 
   Kingdom 
EU12  -0.521 -0.101 -   0.714 - 3.429 
            
   Belgium EU12 -0.257 -1.399 -0.686 -3.149  - 2.174 - 2.034 
   Denmark EU12 -0.539 -0.234 -0.529 -  2.330 0.473 2.507 1.078 
   Ireland EU12 -0.433 -0.977 -0.429 -0.990  - 0.589 - 0.522 
   Netherlands EU12 -0.346 -0.183 -0.280 -  - 0.846 - 0.851 
            
   Germany EU12 -0.262 -0.556 -0.197 -  2.276 1.065 2.411 1.661 
EU15           
   Austria EU15 -0.626 -0.802 -0.489 -  1.830 0.391 1.867 0.772 
   Finland EU15 -0.378 -0.924 -0.355 -0.914  1.139 1.464 - 1.053 
   Sweden EU15 -0.161 -0.353 -0.108 -  1.044 1.595 0.774 2.105 
EU25           
   Hungary EU25  -0.728 -0.695 -0.700   1.083 - - 
   Latvia EU25 -0.945 -0.877    - 1.379   
   Lithuania EU25          
   Malta EU25 -1.117 -1.112 -0.908 -1.644  - 0.775 - 0.792 
   Poland EU25  -0.787 -0.424 -   - - 1.840 
   Cyprus EU25          
Non EU European countries         
   Romania NEU -0.420 -0.725    - -   
   Norway NEU -0.198 -0.464 -0.165 -  - 0.357 - 0.632 
   Switzerland NEU -0.089 -0.146 -0.081 -  1.281 0.825 1.494 1.332 
North, Central and Latin America        
   Canada NA -0.667 -0.673 -0.713 -0.780  - 0.770 - 0.733 
   USA NA -0.150 -0.137 - -0.132  0.965 1.395 0.897 1.479 
   Argentina LA  -     2.046   
   Chile LA -0.331 -0.148 -0.317 -0.249  0.991 1.573 1.106 1.817 
Asia           
   Japan AS -0.240 -0.241 -0.129 -  1.536 0.301 - 0.415 
   China AS -0.706 -3.164 -1.787 -3.804  - 3.112 - 4.085 
   Korea AS -3.713 -2.645 -3.583 -2.335  5.287 1.857 4.947 2.017 
Oceania           
  Australia ***           
  New Zealand OC  -0.731 -0.761 -0.552   2.200 3.055 2.433 
*  no imports into Greece from 1974 to 1977 and from 1980 to 1989;  
** no imports into Spain before 1993/1994 
***  negligible imports: most consumed bananas are produced domestically 
 
 
How do the estimated elasticities compare with estimates of other researchers? FAO 2003 
reports elasticities of export supply for a limited set of countries (Ecuador, Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Carribean producers, African producers and the Philippines) and find that the price 
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elasticity of US$ countries is reasonably high while it is negligible for non US$ countries. 
Our estimations clearly do not support this contention (see Table 3): we find significant non 
zero long run price elasticities for all countries, which are not systematically lower for non 
US$ producers. Some studies simply apply plausible values of elasticities  with limited  
attempts to find empirical support for these elasticities7. Guyomard e.a. (1999) take values for 
the price elasticity of supply of 2 for dollar producers and a value of 1 for all other producers. 
Borrell (Borrell (1990)) uses price elasticity of 1 for favored suppliers and 3 for non-favored 
suppliers. The large difference is attributed to the limited availability of land. This contention 
is not supported by our estimations, despite its intuitive appeal. In support of the applied 
elasticities Borrell makes reference to a World Bank study (World Bank (1985)) and to a 
paper on Jamaica (Pollard and Graham (1985)).  
 
With respect demand elasticities it is conjectured in the FAO study that both income and price 
elasticities will be lower in the major consuming countries relative to those of emerging 
markets due to saturation and demographic developments.  Our estimation results indicate 
below unit income elasticity for the majority of European countries, Japan and Canada, while 
other countries have above unit income elasticity.  
 
Estimated price elasticities of demand in European countries vary widely from close to –1 
(Belgium) to around –0.25 (Denmark, The Netherlands). Kersten (1995) used an EU price 
elasticity of demand of –0.5. Guyomard e.a. (1999) take values for the price elasticity of 
demand ranging from –0.3 to –1.0. Borrell (1990) obtained price elasticities of demand from 
the earlier mentioned World Bank study (World Bank (1985)) and range from –0.4 to –1.0. 
 
Our data suggest that countries whose banana export revenues are relatively small tend to 
have moderate production response, while the production response of countries whose banana 
export revenues are relatively large has a much wider dispersion, ranging from low to high. 
Export elasticities also do not vary systematically with groups of countries. We believe that 
supply elasticities depend on a large number of very different factors like contribution to 
export revenues, domestic demand, (domestic) transport costs, agricultural credit, alternative 
income opportunities, etc. 
 
At this stage it should be noted that the size of supply and demand elasticities are a key 
determinant of the size and direction of eventual result of the simulations of the tariff only 
regime. Sensitivity analysis, also implemented by others (Borrell (1990)) suggests that the 
differences in outcome are large with different assumptions on supply and demand response. 
This justifies extensive investigations of export supply and import demand equations in order 
to obtain estimates of supply and demand elasticities with a substantial degree of accuracy. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Analysing margins between export and import 
In this section we present an analysis of the margin between export unit values and import 
unit values. The FAO data on import and export of bananas do not identify imports by 
country of origin and exports by country of destination. As a result the export (import) unit 
values calculated on the basis of these data constitute a weighted average of the bilateral unit 
values with the share in total exports (imports) as weights. Variation in the export (import) 
unit value may be due to changes in the composition. For this reason we use bilateral trade 
data, i.e. data of exports including country of destination and imports including country of 
                                                          
7 We believe that this is a sound procedure if the elasticities are in the same range of elasticities found 
elsewhere, and if a sensitivity analysis shows that the conclusions do not change fundamentally if other 
elasticities are selected.  
 49
origin. We will use bilateral trade data, obtained from COMTRADE (UNCTAD): these are 
available at the level of the commodity, starting in 1988 and extend to 2003.  
 Although we believe that bilateral trade data are potentially superior to aggregated 
data for the purpose of understanding trade margins, we are suspicious about the quality of 
the data. The poor quality of data on banana production, consumption, trade and prices is 
documented in almost any empirical study in the field of bananas. This motivates a number of 
precautionary measures in using these data, most notably the following two: in the calculation 
of unit values we have restricted the observations to the ones with values of above 100 (hence 
both above 100 times 1000 US$ if trade values are concerned, and above 100 Metric Tonnes). 
Further we experimented with restricting unit values to those unit values where exports (in 
quantities), reported by the exporting country, match the imports (in quantities) reported by 
the importing country. 
 We assume that export unit values are a reasonable proxy for FOB prices and import 
unit values are a reasonable proxy for CIF prices. Figure 4.1 shows medians8 of the margin 
unit value (the difference between export unit values and import unit values) for US dollar 
producers to various destinations. From the Figure it is clear that unit margins for exporting to 
the EU12 (EU15) are much higher relative to all other destinations. Unit margins of exports to 
nearby locations like the 10 EU accession countries, for example, are on a much lower level: 
averaged over the years the unit costs are around 0.34 US$ cents per kg, and only 0.14 US$ 
cents for EU accession countries. This possibly and partly reflects quota rent9 and the costs of 
export licenses, purchased from ACP operators10. Further we note that unit margins of export 
to Asia is slightly higher: this should be attributed to transports costs.  
In order to investigate the margin unit value quantitatively we have estimated a very 
simple model that explains the margin unit value. This model assumes that the difference 
between export and import unit values should be attributed to the countries of origin (the 
exporting countries), to the countries of destination (the importing countries) and a number of 
other variables, most notably the distance between importing and exporting countries. 
Specifically we have estimated the following equation: 
 
 
jk3k2j10jkt DISTANCE)countryimporting(D)countryorting(expDMARGUV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 We have used medians in stead of averages to control for extreme values which are due to 
measurement error. 
9 Quota rent reflects the premium that exporters receive above unrestricted equilibrium price.  
10 Part the dollar quotas is allocated to ACP producers and operators. Selling these quota licenses 
allowed these operators to benefit from the quota rent. Van de Kasteele claims that insufficient quota 
allocation and resulting active trade in licenses has generated an additional cost of 7-8US$ per box, 
which is equivalent to 0.38-0.44 US$ cents per kg (1 box is 18.2 kg). 
 50
Figure 4.1 Unit margins in banana trade 
 
 
Since the full estimation outcome is rather lengthy we have presented below a limited version 
of the estimation outcome (excluding export country dummies and year dummies). The 
dependent variable is unit margin between export unit values of country of origin and import 
unit values of country of destination, in US$ cents, annual data, 1993-2002. 
 
 
Table 4.7 Estimation results for unit margins 
Distance     0.02 (5.7) 
EU15 (importers)    0.23 (6.4) 
Other Europe (importers)   0.32 (7.0) 
North American (importers)   0.07 (2.0) 
Asia(exporters)    0.14  (2.8)  
Constant     0.05  (0.8) 
No. of observations =  916; F( 46, 869) =   13.27; Prob > F =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.4127  Adj R-squared =  0.3816 Root MSE =.14349 
 
The results indicate that the unit margin is much and significantly larger for EU15 countries 
(0.23 US$ cents) and “Other European Countries”, Switzerland and Norway (0.32 US$ 
cents). Even relative to imports to North America (mainly US) this is the case. We believe, as 
mentioned, above that this premium should be attributed to the quota rent and the cost of 
licenses purchased from ACP operators. Further we note that the estimation results suggest 
unit transport cost of 0.2 US$ cents per 1000 knots.  
 
The estimation result may be used to get an approximate quantification of unit transport costs 
for different trade flows. The table below summarizes average per unit transport costs for 
different blocks of origin and destination. Please note that this table is not more than a linear 
transformation of (average) distances. 
Unit margin in US$ banana trade
(bilateral trade data, 
averages of import minus export unit value)
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Table 4.8   Unit direct transport cost between blocks $/kg 
 EU25 NA CLA AS 
European producers 0.00    
ACP Caribbean 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.21 
ACP Africa 0.07 0.09 0.08-0.14 0.22 
Colombia 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.21 
Other CLA (US$) 0.11 0.05 0.04-0.11 0.16-0.21 
ASIA 0.16-0.20 0.13 0.20 0.03 
 
 
4.3 Formalising a partial equilibrium model 
The objective of this project is to evaluate different specifications of the tariff only EU import 
regime, which is planned to be put in place in 2006, and to compare the various modalities of 
the tariff only regime with the pre2006 tariff quota regime. In order to do this we have 
constructed a single commodity partial equilibrium model of the world banana market that 
allows us to simulate a variety of tariff regimes. The model identifies seven exporting blocks 
and seven importing blocks: 
 
Exporting blocks  Countries 
Colombia   Colombia 
Other CLA US$ exporters Ecuador, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala etc. 
Asian exporters  Philippines, Malaysia, China, Thailand, Australia, etc. 
African ACP exporters Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, etc. 
Caribbean ACP exporters Jamaica, Dominican Republic, etc. 
European producers Guadeloupe, Martinique, Spain (Canarian Islands),  
Portugal (Madeira) and Greece (Crete) 
Rest of world exporters South Africa, Turkey and Israel 
 
Importing blocks  Countries 
EU15   European Union (15 member countries) 
EU10acc   ten accession countries 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia,  
    Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia,  
Slovenia, Cyprus & Malta) 
Other Europe   Norway, Switzerland, Iceland,  
   non EU Eastern European countries (Romania, Bulgaria), Russia, Turkey,  
   North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt) 
North America  USA, Canada, 
Central & Latin America Argentina, Chile, Uruquay etc. 
Asia   Japan, China, Korea, New Zealand, Near East, etc. 
Rest of World importers South Africa, other African countries 
 
The following trade matrix, constructed on the basis of bilateral country level COMTRADE 
data, quantifies the relationships between the exporting and importing countries. Total trade 
in bananas is 13 million tonnes in 2000-2002, of which 4.3 million is imported into the EU15, 
4.5 million into North America (mainly US), 2.0 million into Asia (mainly Japan, China), 1.1 
into Other European countries (mainly Norway, Switzerland and Russia). The trade matrix 
shows that the EU15 imports above 70% from Central & Latin American dollar exporters, 
around 20% from ACP countries, and around 7% from European producers. Both the 10 EU 
accession countries, the remaining European countries, North, Central & Latin America 
import close to 100% from Central & Latin American dollar exporters. In Asia the situation is 
entirely different: more than 70% of the imports is supplied by Asia itself (mainly the 
Philippines), while the remainder is supplied by Central & Latin America. European 
producers and ACP producers export only to the EU, while Central & Latin American 
producers export mainly to the North America (44%), the EU15 (27%) and other European 
countries (12%), The Colombian export package is slightly more biased towards the EU and 
less towards other European countries.  
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Table 4.9 Banana trade flows by major import and export blocks 
(averages over the years 2000 to 2002, data reported by importers, in MT) 
 EU15 EU10a Other 
Europe 
NA CLA AS  
European producers 291500 204 3063 14 32 18 294831 
ACP Caribbean 323515 0 3294 6980 4447 1619 339855 
ACP Africa 544873 5544 131 0 0 18 572717 
Colombia 784224 82340 99691 737103 2 47268 1750629 
Other CLA 2331611 339500 1072778 3774680 611195 509815 8639579 
ASIA 378 148 12074 1758 2 1438879 1453239 
 4278156 427737 1191032 4520541 615678 2003357 13058668 
   
 EU15 EU10a Other 
Europe
NA CLA AS  
European producers 6.8% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
ACP Caribbean 7.6% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 0.1%  
ACP Africa 12.7% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Colombia 18.3% 19.3% 8.4% 16.3% 0.0% 2.4%  
Other CLA (US$) 54.5% 79.4% 90.1% 83.5% 99.3% 25.4%  
ASIA 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 71.8%  
   
 EU15 EU10a Other 
Europe
NA CLA AS  
European  producers 98.9% 0.1% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
ACP Caribbean 95.2% 0.0% 1.0% 2.1% 1.3% 0.5%  
ACP Africa 95.1% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Colombia 44.8% 4.7% 5.7% 42.1% 0.0% 2.7%  
Other CLA 27.0% 3.9% 12.4% 43.7% 7.1% 5.9%  
ASIA 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.1% 0.0% 99.0%  
        Source: calculations on the basis of COMTRADE data 
 
The Central and Latin American countries clearly dominate the world market of bananas. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be some market segmentation: the Asian market is largely 
supplied by Asian producers, and mainly by the Philippines, and  only for a limited share by 
Central and Latin American producers. Also the low production costs of the Asian producers 
(see evidence in earlier sections) and the (difference in) transportation costs11 suggest that it 
may be difficult for Central and Latin American producers to increase their market share in 
Asia. 
 
Our simulation model that will be used for investigating the tariff only import regime runs as 
follows: 
 
)1(PRICETRENDs k,jSk,j,2k,j,1j,0k,j   
 
where  
sjk   = export supply by export block j to import block k12 
TREND = trend variable 
                                                          
11 Average and median margin unit costs of US$ exporters, averaged over the years 1991-2003, are 
around twice as high for Asia relative to North America. 
12 j = African ACP exporting countries (ACPAfr), Carribbean ACP exporting countries (ACPCar), 
Colombia (Col), Other Central and Latin American exporting countries (OthCLA), Asian exporting 
countries (Asia); and k = European Union, 25 members (EU25), other European countries (Oth Eur), 
North American countries (NA), Central and Latin American importing countries (CLA), Asian 
importing countries (Asia). 
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PRICES = export supply price of export block j to import block k 
 
)2(ACPjifccPRICEPRICE jkj
*
k,j
S   
where  
cj = export country j specific unit cost of export supply 
cjk = unit transport cost of export supply from country j to country k 
 
)3(ss
k
jkj 
 
Since supply response is estimated for exporting countries (and not for the different bilateral 
trade flows that add up to country j’s  total export supply) we may reformulate this as follows: 
 
 
)'1(PRICETRENDs jSj,2j,1j,0j 
 
and  
 
)'2(ACPjifwtccPRICEPRICE jj
*
j
S 
 
where  
wtcj = export country j specific unit transport cost weigthed with export shares 
 
ACP countries have a tariff preference over non ACP countries if a tariff is imposed  by the 
EU25, and consequently the supply price of ACP countries differs from the supply price of 
non ACP countries  
 
)4(25EUkandACPjiftccPRICE.PRICE jkj
*
k,j
S 
 
Because ACP countries mainly export to the European Union, we may approximate this with 
 
)'4(ACPjiftwtccPRICEPRICE jj
*
j
S 
 
The import demand is determined by per capita GDP and the real price of bananas: 
 
)5(PRICEtaGDPpercapid kDk,2k,1k,0k 
 
where  
dk    = import demand from country k 
GDPpercapita  = per capita gross domestic product  / income 
PRICED  = import demand price 
 
25EUkifcPRICEPRICE
)6(25EUkiftcPRICEPRICE
k
*
k
D
k
*
k
D


 
where  
ck = import country k specific unit cost of import demand 
t = (the unit) import tariff of the EU25 
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Equation(s) (1) to (3) establish the export supply block of the model. The elasticities in 
equations (1) are based on the estimations reported in the start of this chapter. Export supply 
is assumed to depend on a trend variable and on export supply prices. Export unit values are 
assumed to be the relevant prices to estimate export supply response. Equation (2) connects 
the export unit values to the market equilibrium price, by assuming a export country specific 
costs and transport costs (the latter both export country and import country specific). 
Equations(s) (4) and (5) establish the import demand block of the model. The elasticities in 
these equations are, again, based on the estimations reported in the start of this chapter. 
Equation (5) specifies the tariff only import regime of the EU after 2006, and equation (6) and 
(6’) specify the zero tariff preference for ACP countries.  Equation (7) and (8) define 
aggregate export supply and import demand, and equation (9) establishes market equilibrium. 
 
 
4.4 Simulations 
The simulation model distinguishes five export supply blocks (ACP Africa, ACP Caribbean, 
Colombia, Other Central & Latin American countries and Asia) and five import blocks 
(EU25, Other Europe, North America, Central and Latin America, and Asia). The starting 
point of the model needs to be the market situation prior to 2006, but as close to 2006 as 
possible. In particular the position of the ACP countries in these years is important since the 
tariff only regime requires a similar level of protection to producers in these countries. Hence 
we will calibrate the model on the most recent data that we have, data that we still consider to 
be reliable. Since most recent reliable data are from 2001 and 2002 we have used the 
observations of 2001 and 2002 as starting values. Hence, prices and quantities are calibrated 
on their 2001 and 2002 levels. All output is expressed in constant 2002 prices. At this stage 
we did not attempt to model exchange rate developments and, hence, the 2002 exchange rates 
are fixed for the simulation period. We study the impact of the introduction of a tariff only 
regime in 2003 (or equivalently we assume that our values for 2001 and 2002 are the values 
of 2004 and 2005 because we believe that the construction of data for 2003 to 2005 
introduces further error in the simulations). 
Each block has its own price, either export supply or import demand, but there is one 
world market equilibrium price: block prices are connected to the world market equilibrium 
price through a constant mark-up (either negative or positive), hence:  
 
p(import demand from block i) = p(equilibrium) + margin(demand block i)  and  
 
p(export supply from block j) = p(equilibrium) - margin(supply block j) 
 
These margins are also calibrated on the basis of the 2001 and 2002 export and import unit 
values.  
For simulation of the tariff only regime we need to specify the import tariff, e.g. 
75US$ per ton. Additionally we need to adjust the EU import demand margin for the unit 
quota rent, since this margin is based on historical series during which a quota rent is earned. 
It is assumed that the unit quota rent moves around 0.10 to 0.15 US$. Finally, we are 
controlling for the preferential treatment of ACP countries by adjusting the cost mark up of 
the ACP exporters, so that their export supply price is exempted from the EU import tariff: 
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this appears to be an acceptable procedure since almost all banana exports by ACP countries 
is exported to the EU.  
Supply response and demand response functions, estimated with error correction 
mechanisms, distinguish both long run and short run and specify the dynamic path of supply 
and demand of the different blocks to equilibrium. The following long run elasticities are 
obtained from direct estimation on block level13: 
 
Export supply elasticities Import demand elasticities 
ACP African 0.603  EU25 -0.517 
ACP Carribean 1.402 Other Europe -0.288 
Colombia 0.337   North America -0.318 
Other Central & Latin 
America 
0.418    Central & Latin America
  
-0.158 
Asia 0.933 Asia  -0.566 
 
Development of per capita gross domestic income in the different import blocks is 
extrapolated using an appropriate polynomial of time. A complete overview of the model, 
also including the program code is available 
 
                                                          
13 The weighted sum of elasticities obtained from country level estimations (see Section above) comes 
fairly close to the ones we find by block level estimation. Therefore we have decided to use the 
elasticities obtained through block-level estimation. Simulations run with elasticities obtained as the 
weighted sum of elasticities from country level estimations are available on request. 
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5. Calculation of future scenarios  
 
The ingredients for the calculations have now been assembled. Representative of the prices on 
the demand side (inclusive of quota rents, but excluding the tariff) can be the import unit 
value of bananas into the EU. Representative for the FOB prices is the average export unit 
value of the dollar zone countries. 
 
We use the average values for the last three years that are available at this moment. These are 
2001-2003 for import values and 2000-2002 for the export unit values. 
 
Imports into the EU from dollar zone countries stood at 2537 thousand tons. ACP countries 
provided 747 thousand tons, EU producers 770 thousand tons, totaling 4055 thousand tons.  
Quotas allocated to ACP countries (C-quota) were 750 kilotons, and to other importers 2630 
thousand tons (2530 in 2001). Quotas plus production (770) equals therefore 4130, close 
enough to the average imports to assume the quota were binding.  
  
Starting from this position, we shall first calculate what prices and quantities would be if 
neither quotas nor any tariff would be applied to banana imports into the EU. Thereafter, we 
shall gradually increase the tariff for dollar producers and see the implications. 
 
An important step is to model the relationships between the various prices. Starting from the 
EU-price at import for shipments from Latin America, the tariff is added in moving to the 
consumers. The same price, in principle, applies to bananas coming from ACP states, but no 
tariff is charged. Yet, quota rents may apply, and they can be higher for ACP bananas, as 
these enjoy the tariff preference, than for non-ACP bananas. Rents, however, can only occur 
if access to the market is restricted. The Figure 5.1 below shows how total ACP supply 
related to the quota allocated to the ACP imports. In particular the two most recent years 
show how quotas actually become more and more binding with the lowering of quotas and 
increasing supply. 
Yet the Figure hides the differences between countries. From 1993 until 1999, country quotas 
were in place, granting for example Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire tariff-free imports to a 
maximum of 162 500 tons each. This was a binding constraint at that time for both countries, 
and as soon as the country quota were lifted they expanded their exports to the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Imports from ACP countries and the relevant quotas. 
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Binding quotas imply rents14. As these are related to import quantities, they should show up in 
the CIF prices. If they are not transmitted to producers, they show up in the margin between 
FOB and CIF prices. 
 
5.1 Price relationships 
The conclusion of the foregoing discussion is that there is reason to believe that rents not only 
occur in the margins FOB-to-CIF of Latin American exports, but also in those of African 
exports to the EU. And the implication is that when the quotas are abolished, the rents and 
therefore these margins go down. 
 
The following Table makes clear how observed prices (in bold) in the statistical data sources 
are related. 
 
Table 5.1 Prices CIF EU and FOB producing regions 
EU import price including tariff 65.5  
     
  Dollar 
countries
ACP Africa ACP Caribbean 
     
Tariff  7.5 0 0 
differential rents/costs in EU 6.5 -2.5 
EU import Unit Values 58 59 68 
international quota rents 10 12 0 
transport costs 20 20 20 
FOB prices  28 27 48 
 
 
If we were to take the observed import and export unit values for facts, and if we assume 
transport costs not to differ substantially between the various origins, there are likely to be 
rents on the shipments from ACP Africa and Latin America in the order of size of 10 to 12 
euro cents per kg. 
 
If, therefore, the quota system is abolished, these rents will disappear. If they are “replaced” 
by a tariff on imports from some origins, the tariff will show up in the margin between Import 
Unit Value from these origins and the wholesale price. This may affect the unit import value 
of these origins and the FOB prices.  
 
The following relationships are relevant. 
 
                                                          
14 And even below the quota levels, they may generate rents to the owners of the licenses if these are 
left unused 
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A. Present system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram shows how Latin American exports have two main destinations, one is the USA 
the other the EU (not shown is Asia, but it is included in the model). Arbitrage between the 
two destinations secures equality of the prices FOB for both destinations. Getting from the 
LA FOB price to the EU consumer price requires adding transport cost to EU, rents of the 
quotas incorporated in the margin, the tariff and other domestic transport and retailing costs. 
The EU consumer can choose between bananas from Latin America or ACP countries, and 
prices should more or less be equal at consumer level. Subtract from these consumer prices 
again the domestic transport costs and the international transport costs to Caribbean, and one 
arrives at FOB ACP Caribbean prices. To get ACP African prices, not just transport costs 
should be subtracted, but also quota rents on the African imports into the EU. Adding values 
to these relationships we have 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 CIF prices, costs and FOB prices 
 In euro or US cent per kg   
     
 USA EU 
cons price 110 155 
Costs 68 90 96 87 
Tariff  7.5   
CIF price 42 58 59 68 
Rent  10 12  
Costs 14 20 20 20 
FOB price 28 27 48 
 LA ACP-Af ACP-Car 
 
Wholesale prices prevailing, on average in the EU15 in 2002, were around 155 euro cents per 
kg. At the recorded CIF prices, the margins for retailing the bananas from the various origins 
amount to between 87 and 96 cents (if the wholesale prices would be the same for all origins, 
which they are not).  
 
In the new system, the rents would disappear, but the tariff may change. The typical situation 
where the same price would still hold for the ACP African countries could mechanically be 
obtained by keeping all cost items the same, and calculating the necessary changes in other 
LA exports 
Imports USA 
Imports  EU 
 
 
 
Imports EU 
Transport + 
rents 
Transport  
ACP Caribbean 
exports 
ACP African 
exports 
Transport  
Transport + 
rents 
Tariff 
USA 
Consumer
 
EU 
Consumer 
Transport  
Transport  
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variables (the prices other than FOB ACP Africa) to achieve this. This can be done by putting 
the price of 27 for ACP African countries at the bottom, adding the transport costs (kept at 
20) to this price to arrive at CIF EU prices equal to 47. Add the domestic costs of 96 to arrive 
at wholesale prices of 143 cents per kg. From this wholesale price we can go down to the 
corresponding FOB prices in ACP-Caribbean, and (with an assumption on the tariff) to the 
FOB Latin America. From the latter, we can calculate what the price in the USA should be. 
The results are shown in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 CIF prices, costs, FOB prices with tariff of X and FOB 
prices in ACP Africa equal to 27 
 In euro or US cent per kg   
     
 USA EU 
cons price 115-X 143 
Costs 68 90 96 87 
Tariff  X   
CIF price 47-X 53-X 47 56 
Rent  0 0  
Costs 14 20 20 20 
FOB price 33-X 27 36 
 LA ACP-Af ACP-Car 
 
Starting from 27 cents/kg FOB ACP Africa, and keeping costs the same, consumer price in 
EU could fall to 143 cents. The implication is, however, that prices facing ACP Caribbean 
producers would fall too, namely from 48 to 36 cents, the difference being equal to the rent on 
African supplies which is not (yet) on Caribbean supplies.  
At a tariff on Latin American supplies to the EU, equal to X, the FOB price in Latin America 
may fall to 33-X. Hence for X=5, FOB prices remain the same; for X=7.5, FOB prices go 
down a bit. The same tariff X is found to affect the USA import and USA consumer price. 
 
This approach is not consistent with market behaviour however. As can be easily observed, 
the lower consumer prices should lead to higher demand for bananas, but as FOB prices in 
ACP countries do not rise, and those in LA countries fall for X>5, the higher demand in the 
EU cannot be met. A tariff below 5 cents may help, as this triggers more production, but the 
outcome depends on supply and demand elasticities.  
 
5.2 Modeling results 
This is where the estimated elasticities come in. Chapter 4 gave the background for the 
estimated elasticities, how these were derived and how they are put together in a consistent 
framework for simulation purposes. 
 
We have used the following basic elements for the standard case believed to be representative 
of the situation around 2005. 
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Table 5.4 Basis for the calculations 
Standard case    
 FOB prices Exports Elasticity
 € cent 1000 t
ACP-Africa 25 500 .60
ACP-Caribbean 44 350 1.40
Colombia 28 1400 0.34
Other C&LA  24 8200 .42
Asia 17 1750 .93
Total exports 12200
 
Tariff 7.5
Price CIF 56
 CIF prices Imports
NA demand 32 4500 -0.32
EU15 56 3900 -0.52
Other Eur 40 1000 -0.29
Asia 41 2400 -0.57
LA imports 28 400 -0.16
Total imports 12200
 
 
FOB prices in Colombia and other Central and Latin America and import unit values in the 
EU are linked through a margin consisting of 32 cents (28 for Colombia) including 10 cents 
quota rent. EU internal prices are higher by the tariff and other costs, which latter are 
neglected here. 
Prices prevailing FOB in ACP African countries are derived from the EU-internal price. From 
this internal price no tariff is deducted, but transport costs of 21 cents and a rent of 10 cents 
are. This brings total international margin at 31 cents. To this, a EU-domestic price 
differential must be added of 7.5 cents, so that the ACP-African FOB prices, given the EU 
internal price of 63.5 arrives at a level of 25, as is observed for average African ACP. 
For ACP Caribbean a similar procedure is followed but without the incorporation of a rent, 
and costs again equal to 19.5 cents per kg, bringing their FOB prices at a much higher level 
than those in Africa.  
Asian prices are linked to the Latin American prices with a difference of 7 cents. North-
American prices are 8 cents higher than the export prices from Latin America. 
 
Crucial element in the simulation is the hypothesis (which we believe to be true) that the 
quota rent is incorporated into the premium on exports to the EU. Reducing the quota 
restriction amounts to reducing the CIF price at a given level of the FOB price. The link 
between what happens with the CIF price and the quota is provided by the elasticity of 
demand.  
 
A comparison of amounts consumed in the EU15 in 1992 and 1994 shows that the quota 
constrained demand in the order of 10%, which is equal to the effect of a price increase by 
19% or one fifth. At the import unit value of 59 cents, this means that 12 cents are quota rents 
per kg. Hence, abolishment of the quota would be tantamount to a reduction of the EU 
margins between FOB and CIF for both the Lain American countries and the ACP African 
countries by a rounded 10 cents. At given EU prices, this would of course increase FOB 
prices in Latin America, but even more in the African ACP countries, whose prices are fully 
dictated by the EU market.  
 
The following results are obtained. 
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Table 5.5 Simulation results 
  Basis 1 2 3 4 
Assumptions    
Tariff €ct/kg 7.5 0.0 7.5 15.0 23.0 
rent LA €ct/kg 10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
rent ACP Africa €ct/kg 10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Results    
EU price cif+tariff €ct/kg 63.5 48.4 54.7 61.1 68.0 
FOB price LA €ct/kg 24.0 26.4 25.2 24.1 23.0 
ACP Africa production 1000 t 500 436 514 586 659 
ACP Afr fob-prices €ct/kg 25.0 19.9 26.2 32.6 39.5 
ACP Afr Export value € 10^9 13 9 13 19 26 
ACP Caribbean prod 1000 t 350 194 256 323 401 
ACP Caribbean price €ct/kg 44.0 28.9 35.2 41.6 48.5 
ACP Carib. Export value € 10^9 15 6 9 13 19 
Colombia prod 1000 t 1400 1440 1420 1401 1383 
Other C&LA production 1000 t 8200 8536 8365 8209 8056 
    
Implications    
EU25 import demand 1000 t 3900 4490 4216 3980 3764 
LA X to EU25 1000 t 3150 3916 3519 3163 2818 
Tariff revenues € 10^6 236 0 264 474 648 
 
 
Table 5.5 shows the first results of the simulations for the situation in which no quota rents 
are enjoyed, while tariffs vary from 0 to €230 per ton. 
The abolishment of the quota, and the concomitant licensing system, means that there would 
be free entry into the transport and import market into the EU. This is bound to lead to 
considerable cost savings, here estimated at 10 cents a kg (or €100/ton). 
This is applied both to Africa and to the trade with Latin America, with the implication that 
producers in these countries are better off. Consumers, too, are better off, as producer prices 
and consumer prices come closer.  
In the first simulation (column 1), with no intervention whatsoever, the margin between 
producer and consumer prices falls to 22 cents, compared to nearly 40 cents in the base 
scenario. Initially, consumer prices may fall to (63.5-10-7.5=) 46 cents. After adjustment of 
the world market prices to restore equilibrium, this settles somewhat higher, at 48.4 cents. 
Producers in Latin America benefit substantially, due to higher prices (26.4 in stead of 24 
cents) and more production. Their African colleagues, though enjoying the removal of the 
quota rent (+10 cents) suffer from the reduction in their reference price. The margin with the 
EU price is no longer 38.5 cents, but only 28.5, but this is not enough to compensate for the 
reduction in EU prices. Producers in the Caribbean do not benefit from the removal of quota-
rents, and suffer from the lower EU price directly. Their prices fall below 30 cents, which, by 
the way, is still not low enough to make exports to the USA an attractive alternative. 
 
Higher levels of the tariff (columns 2-4), in the scenarios where quota rents no longer occur, 
improve the position of the ACP producers and are worse for the Latin American producers. 
Roughly, for every 7 cents that is added to the tariff, LA prices fall by one cent, while ACP 
prices increase by 6 cents. African producers would be as well off as in the basic scenario, as 
soon as the tariff reaches 6.5 cents, while Caribbean producer prices would only be equal to 
the base price for a tariff in the order of 18 cents. A tariff of 23 cents leads to better incomes 
for all ACP producers, and less revenue for the other producers in the world. 
. 
The translation of the Doha waiver text (‘any rebinding of the EC-tariff on bananas under the 
relevant GATT Article XXVIII procedures should result in at least maintaining total market 
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access for MFN banana suppliers’ (source WT/MIN(01)/15, 14 November 2001)) into the 
model was done by investigating what tariff for the non-ACP countries would lead to an fob 
price for these countries similar to the base scenario. In the model the base scenario had a 
price of €240 per ton fob for Latin American producers. To have the same fob price (and 
therefore, the same production in Latin America), a tariff of €154/ton results from the model 
calculations. 
At this tariff, exports from Latin America to the EU will likely be somewhat below the 
original exports to the EU (3144 in stead of 3150 as in the base scenario), because the exports 
by ACP countries are simulated to increase beyond the original quota of 750,000 tonnes. In 
this simulation, the ACP producers in Africa will expand their production drastically (from 
500 to 590), while the producers in the Caribbean will decrease their production (from 350 to 
327). EU CIF+tariff prices will be somewhat lower (€614 in stead of €635) so that total EU 
demand will rise to 3968 tons. 
 
Alternatively, one could simulate what tariff should apply to assure that the Latin American 
countries have the same import-market share in the EU market, as they have under the 
current regime (in the base scenario: 3150 out of 3900).  To this end, we simulate the same 
regime, i.e. we remove the quota rents for Latin America and for the ACP, and look for the 
tariff that would grant Latin America a share in the EU-imports equal to 80.8%. In doing so, 
we assume that from the Caribbean production (in the basis 350 thousand tons), 5/7 will go to 
the EU (in the basis 250 000 tons). 
The resulting tariff should be lower than the €157/ton simulated earlier. Indeed it comes at 
€126/ton. At this level, the share of the Latin American countries in the EU import market is 
again 80.8%. F.o.b. prices would be slightly higher (from €240 to €244). LA exports to the 
EU-25 would be 3272 000 tons, that is some 122 000 tons higher than the base scenario. 
 
Finally, a tariff that would lead to the same quantity of imports into the EU from Latin 
America would be a tariff of €153/ton, as this would lead to imports from Latin America of 
again the 3150 tons, assumed for the base scenario. 
 
Table 5.6 provides another set of simulations. Here we simulated what would be the exact 
tariff equivalent under various assumptions. The first assumption was that there would be 
no response from ACP producers, but only from Latin American producers. This is 
tantamount to the simplistic calculation of the tariff equivalent. If we look for the tariff that 
clears the market at the old price, obviously we arrive at 10+7.5=17.5 cents for the tariff, 
being the sum of the old tariff and the old quota-rent. Column (10). 
 
If, however, we let the ACP producers respond to the removal of the quota rent, and still want 
to raise the tariff to a level where the original world market price would apply, we need only 
raise the tariff to 15.4, in stead of the 17.5 in the simple calculation (see column 11). This is 
the empirical equivalent of what was shown in Figure 3.2: for the establishment of the tariff 
equivalent, it matters what is changing for the other producers.  
 
The simulation reported in column (12) goes one step further. Here we assume that a tariff is 
chosen so as to make the African ACP producers as well off as in the base scenario. Now a 
tariff of only 6.1 cents is needed. 
Column (13), finally, investigates the question what would happen if the alleged reduction in 
quota rents in the African trade does not materialize. Suppose, only a reduction by 5 cents 
would be possible. In this case, a higher tariff is needed to help African producers: 12 cents 
per kg, or €120/ton. In the last two scenarios, Caribbean producers are not well off. Their 
revenues dwindle, as the producer prices fall along with EU prices. 
 
The last line of the Tables provides information on the revenues of the EU from collecting the 
tariff. While in the standard scenario these amount to €236 million, they shoot up to over 
€600 million for a tariff of 23 cents. 
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Table 5.6 Simulation results (cont’d) 
  Basis 10 11 12 13 
Assumptions    
Tariff €ct/kg 7.5 17.5 15.4 6.1 12.0 
rent LA €ct/kg 10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
rent ACP Africa €ct/kg 10 na 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Results    
EU price cif+tariff €ct/kg 63.5 63.5 61.4 53.5 58.6 
FOB price LA €ct/kg 24.0 24.0 24.0** 25.4 24.6 
ACP Africa production 1000 t 500 500* 590 500** 502** 
ACP Afr fob-prices €ct/kg 25.0 25.0 32.9 25.0 25.1 
ACP Afr Export value € 10^9 13 13 19 12 13 
ACP Caribbean prod 1000 t 350 350* 327 244 297 
ACP Caribbean price €ct/kg 44.0 44.0 41.9 34.0 39.1 
ACP Carib. Export value € 10^9 15 15 14 8 12 
Colombia prod 1000 t 1400 1400 1400 1423 1411 
Oter C&LA production 1000 t 8200 8200 8200 8395 8290 
    
Implications    
EU25 import demand 1000 t 3900 3900 3968 4264 4065 
LA X to EU25 1000 t 3150 3150 3144 3590 3351 
Tariff revenues € 10^6 236 551 485 219 402 
    * fixed;  **: targeted 
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5.3 Conclusions 
 
The empirical investigations led us to believe that quota rents were incorporated in the 
international margins. These quota rents have varied over the years and were on average 
around 8 euro cents. This order of size is commensurate with the comparison over time, with 
the comparison over groups (ACP producers and Latin American producers) and with the 
changes that have occurred in the early period of the CMOB. These latter actually suggested a 
slightly higher amount, around 12 cents. 
In the simulations we have taken 10 cents, both for the margins between EU and Latin 
America, and for those between EU and Africa. This amount is therefore substantially below 
the quota rent that is implicit in the European Commissioner’s proposal. The Commission 
proposes a new tariff of €230/ton, implying a quota rent of €155/ton. We do not see the 
evidence in recent years for this size of the rent. 
 
The introduction of a removal of a binding quota for the Africa producers, or at least a rent, 
changes the calculations of tariffs that are equivalent to the removal of the other quota, that on 
the trade with Latin America. 
The simple approach is to add the quota rent and the ruling tariff of 7.5 to yield a new tariff of 
17.5 cents. This would apply if no supply response were forthcoming from the ACP 
producers. Now that there is such response, the mere removal of their (binding) quota or the 
liberalisation of their trade would lead to a supply response. Taking this into account reduces 
the pure tariff equivalent to 15.4 cents. This tariff is called ‘pure’ as it is the tariff that restores 
the old price, in spite of the removal of both quotas. This is not normally the aim of a tariff 
equivalent. Maintaining equivalent access for the ACP producers to the EU market is among 
the explicit aims of the tariff setting. This would already be achieved at a tariff of 6 cents, as 
this provides the African producers with the same incentives as the original price. The 
Caribbean producers would not benefit, but would lose trade in this case, while the Latin 
American producers would still see their trade enhanced. Securing access to the EU of an 
equivalent amount as before (Adding all ACP producers) would require a tariff of around 12 
cents or €120 per ton. In this case, Caribbean producers would still not benefit as much as 
their African colleagues. 
 
Simulations with other parameter values, such as higher supply elasticities (not reported) 
show that these conclusions are not very sensitive to the elasticities chosen. Simulations with 
an attenuated form of quota rent removal, namely only 5 cents per kg, showed that in this case 
the effects for the African and Latin American producers are somewhat more unfavourable.  
 
Latin American producers, and Colombia as one of them, are likely to be hurt by any tariff 
that is higher than €150 euro per ton. 
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Appendix A relevant GATT article XXVIII 
 
XXIX. Article XXVIII  
A. Text of Article XXVIII  
Article XXVIII*: Modification of Schedules 
1. On the first day of each three-year period, the first period beginning on 1 January 1958 (or on the first 
day of any other period* that may be specified by the CONTRACTING PARTIES by two-thirds of the 
votes cast) a contracting party (hereafter in this Article referred to as the “applicant contracting party”) 
may, by negotiation and agreement with any contracting party with which such concession was initially 
negotiated and with any other contracting party determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a 
principal supplying interest* (which two preceding categories of contracting parties, together with the 
applicant contracting party, are in this Article hereinafter referred to as the “contracting parties primarily 
concerned”), and subject to consultation with any other contracting party determined by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a substantial interest* in such concession, modify or withdraw a 
concession* included in the appropriate schedule annexed to this Agreement. 
2. In such negotiations and agreement, which may include provision for compensatory adjustment with 
respect to other products, the contracting parties concerned shall endeavour to maintain a general level of 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in 
this Agreement prior to such negotiations. 
3. (a) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily concerned cannot be reached before 1 
January 1958 or before the expiration of a period envisaged in paragraph 1 of this Article, the 
contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the concession shall, nevertheless, be free to do 
so and if such action is taken any contracting party with which such concession was initially negotiated, 
any contracting party determined under paragraph 1 to have a principal supplying interest and any 
contracting party determined under paragraph 1 to have a substantial interest shall then be free not later 
than six months after such action is taken, to withdraw, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day 
on which written notice of such withdrawal is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, substantially 
equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the applicant contracting party. 
(b) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily concerned is reached but any other contracting 
party determined under paragraph 1 of this Article to have a substantial interest is not satisfied, such 
other contracting party shall be free, not later than six months after action under such agreement is taken, 
to withdraw, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written notice of such withdrawal 
is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated 
with the applicant contracting party. 
4. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at any time, in special circumstances, authorize* a contracting 
party to enter into negotiations for modification or withdrawal of a concession included in the 
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement subject to the following procedures and conditions: 
(a) Such negotiations* and any related consultations shall be conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article. 
(b) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily concerned is reached in the 
negotiations, the provisions of paragraph 3 (b) of this Article shall apply. 
(c) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily concerned is not reached within a 
period of sixty days* after negotiations have been authorized, or within such longer period as 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES may have prescribed, the applicant contracting party may 
refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 
(d) Upon such reference, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly examine the matter 
and submit their views to the contracting parties primarily concerned with the aim of achieving 
a settlement. If a settlement is reached, the provisions of paragraph 3 (b) shall apply as if 
agreement between the contracting parties primarily concerned had been reached. If no 
settlement is reached between the contracting parties primarily concerned, the applicant 
contracting party shall be free to modify or withdraw the concession, unless the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES determine that the applicant contracting party has unreasonably 
failed to offer adequate compensation.* If such action is taken, any contracting party with 
which the concession was initially negotiated, any contracting party determined under 
paragraph 4 (a) to have a principal supplying interest and any contracting party determined 
under paragraph 4 (a) to have a substantial interest, shall be free, not later than six months after 
such action is taken, to modify or withdraw, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on 
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which written notice of such withdrawal is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with applicant contracting party. 
5. Before 1 January 1958 and before the end of any period envisaged in paragraph 1 a contracting party 
may elect by notifying the CONTRACTING PARTIES to reserve the right, for the duration of the next 
period, to modify the appropriate Schedule in accordance with the procedures of paragraph 1 to 3. If a 
contracting party so elects, other contracting parties shall have the right, during the same period, to 
modify or withdraw, in accordance with the same procedures, concessions initially negotiated with that 
contracting party. 
B. Text of AD Article XXVIII  
Ad Article XXVIII 
The CONTRACTING PARTIES and each contracting party concerned should arrange to conduct the 
negotiations and consultations with the greatest possible secrecy in order to avoid premature disclosure 
of details of prospective tariff changes. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be informed immediately 
of all changes in national tariffs resulting from recourse to this Article. 
Paragraph 1 
1. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES specify a period other than a three-year period, a contracting party 
may act pursuant to paragraph 1 or paragraph 3 of Article XXVIII on the first day following the 
expiration of such other period and, unless the CONTRACTING PARTIES have again specified another 
period, subsequent periods will be three-year periods following the expiration of such specified period. 
2. The provision that on 1 January 1958, and on other days determined pursuant to paragraph 1, a 
contracting party “may ... modify or withdraw a concession” means that on such day, and on the first day 
after the end of each period, the legal obligation of such contracting party under Article II is altered; it 
does not mean that the changes in its customs tariff should necessarily be made effective on that day. If a 
tariff change resulting from negotiations undertaken pursuant to this Article is delayed, the entry into 
force of any compensatory concessions may be similarly delayed. 
3. Not earlier than six months, nor later than three months, prior to 1 January 1958, or to the termination 
date of any subsequent period, a contracting party wishing to modify or withdraw any concession 
embodied in the appropriate Schedule, should notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES to this effect. The 
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall then determine the contracting party or contracting parties with which 
the negotiations or consultations referred to in paragraph 1 shall take place. Any contracting party so 
determined shall participate in such negotiations or consultations with the applicant contracting party 
with the aim of reaching agreement before the end of the period. Any extension of the assured life of the 
Schedules shall relate to the Schedules as modified after such negotiations, in accordance with 
paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article XXVIII. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES are arranging for 
multilateral tariff negotiations to take place within the period of six months before 1 January 1958, or 
before any other day determined pursuant to paragraph 1, they shall include in the arrangements for such 
negotiations suitable procedures for carrying out the negotiations referred to in this paragraph. 
4. The object of providing for the participation in the negotiation of any contracting party with a 
principle supplying interest, in addition to any contracting party with which the concession was 
originally negotiated, is to ensure that a contracting party with a larger share in the trade affected by the 
concession than a contracting party with which the concession was originally negotiated shall have an 
effective opportunity to protect the contractual right which it enjoys under this Agreement. On the other 
hand, it is not intended that the scope of the negotiations should be such as to make negotiations and 
agreement under Article XXVIII unduly difficult nor to create complications in the application of this 
Article in the future to concessions which result from negotiations thereunder. Accordingly, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES should only determine that a contracting party has a principal supplying 
interest if that contracting party has had, over a reasonable period of time prior to the negotiations, a 
larger share in the market of the applicant contracting party than a contracting party with which the 
concession was initially negotiated or would, in the judgement of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, have 
had such a share in the absence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions maintained by the applicant 
contracting party. It would therefore not be appropriate for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to determine 
that more than one contracting party, or in those exceptional cases where there is near equality more than 
two contracting parties, had a principal supplying interest. 
5. Notwithstanding the definition of a principal supplying interest in note 4 to paragraph 1, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES may exceptionally determine that a contracting party has a principal 
supplying interest if the concession in question affects trade which constitutes a major part of the total 
exports of such contracting party. 
6. It is not intended that provision for participation in the negotiations of any contracting party with a 
principal supplying interest, and for consultation with any contracting party having a substantial interest 
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in the concession which the applicant contracting party is seeking to modify or withdraw, should have 
the effect that it should have to pay compensation or suffer retaliation greater than the withdrawal or 
modification sought, judged in the light of the conditions of trade at the time of the proposed withdrawal 
or modification, making allowance for any discriminatory quantitative restrictions maintained by the 
applicant contracting party. 
7. The expression “substantial interest” is not capable of a precise definition and accordingly may 
present difficulties for the CONTRACTING PARTIES. It is, however, intended to be construed to cover 
only those contracting parties which have, or in the absence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions 
affecting their exports could reasonably be expected to have, a significant share in the market of the 
contracting party seeking to modify or withdraw the concession. 
Paragraph 4 
1. Any request for authorization to enter into negotiations shall be accompanied by all relevant statistical 
and other data. A decision on such request shall be made within thirty days of its submission. 
2. It is recognized that to permit certain contracting parties, depending in large measure on a relatively 
small number of primary commodities and relying on the tariff as an important aid for furthering 
diversification of their economies or as an important source of revenue, normally to negotiate for the 
modification or withdrawal of concessions only under paragraph (1) of Article XXVIII, might cause 
them at such time to make modifications or withdrawals which in the long run would prove unnecessary. 
To avoid such a situation the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall authorize any such contracting party, 
under paragraph 4, to enter into negotiations unless they consider this would result in, or contribute 
substantially towards, such an increase in tariff levels as to threaten the stability of the Schedules to this 
Agreement or lead to undue disturbance of international trade. 
3. It is expected that negotiations authorized under paragraph 4 for modification or withdrawal of a 
single item, or a very small group of items, could normally be brought to a conclusion in sixty days. It is 
recognized, however, that such a period will be inadequate for cases involving negotiations for the 
modification or withdrawal of a larger number of items and in such cases, therefore, it would be 
appropriate for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to prescribe a longer period. 
4. The determination referred to in paragraph 4 (d) shall be made by the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
within thirty days of the submission of the matter to them unless the applicant contracting party agrees to 
a longer period. 
5. In determining under paragraph 4 (d) whether an applicant contracting party has unreasonably failed 
to offer adequate compensation, it is understood that the CONTRACTING PARTIES will take due 
account of the special position of a contracting party which has bound a high proportion of its tariffs at 
very low rates of duty and to this extent has less scope than other contracting parties to make 
compensatory adjustment. 
C. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994  
Members hereby agree as follows: 
1. For the purposes of modification or withdrawal of a concession, the Member which has the highest 
ratio of exports affected by the concession (i.e. exports of the product to the market of the Member 
modifying or withdrawing the concession) to its total exports shall be deemed to have a principal 
supplying interest if it does not already have an initial negotiating right or a principal supplying interest 
as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XXVIII. It is however agreed that this paragraph will be 
reviewed by the Council for Trade in Goods five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement with a view to deciding whether this criterion has worked satisfactorily in securing a 
redistribution of negotiating rights in favour of small and medium-sized exporting Members. If this is 
not the case, consideration will be given to possible improvements, including, in the light of the 
availability of adequate data, the adoption of a criterion based on the ratio of exports affected by the 
concession to exports to all markets of the product in question. 
2. Where a Member considers that it has a principal supplying interest in terms of paragraph 1, it should 
communicate its claim in writing, with supporting evidence, to the Member proposing to modify or 
withdraw a concession, and at the same time inform the Secretariat. Paragraph 4 of the “Procedures for 
Negotiations under Article XXVIII” adopted on 10 November 1980 (BISD 27S/26-28) shall apply in 
these cases. 
3. In the determination of which Members have a principal supplying interest (whether as provided for in 
paragraph 1 above or in paragraph 1 of Article XXVIII) or substantial interest, only trade in the affected 
product which has taken place on an MFN basis shall be taken into consideration. However, trade in the 
affected product which has taken place under non-contractual preferences shall also be taken into 
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account if the trade in question has ceased to benefit from such preferential treatment, thus becoming 
MFN trade, at the time of the negotiation for the modification or withdrawal of the concession, or will do 
so by the conclusion of that negotiation. 
4. When a tariff concession is modified or withdrawn on a new product (i.e. a product for which three 
years’ trade statistics are not available) the Member possessing initial negotiating rights on the tariff line 
where the product is or was formerly classified shall be deemed to have an initial negotiating right in the 
concession in question. The determination of principal supplying and substantial interests and the 
calculation of compensation shall take into account, inter alia, production capacity and investment in the 
affected product in the exporting Member and estimates of export growth, as well as forecasts of demand 
for the product in the importing Member. For the purposes of this paragraph, “new product” is 
understood to include a tariff item created by means of a breakout from an existing tariff line. 
5. Where a Member considers that it has a principal supplying or a substantial interest in terms of 
paragraph 4, it should communicate its claim in writing, with supporting evidence, to the Member 
proposing to modify or withdraw a concession, and at the same time inform the Secretariat. Paragraph 4 
of the above-mentioned “Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII” shall apply in these cases. 
6. When an unlimited tariff concession is replaced by a tariff rate quota, the amount of compensation 
provided should exceed the amount of the trade actually affected by the modification of the concession. 
The basis for the calculation of compensation should be the amount by which future trade prospects 
exceed the level of the quota. It is understood that the calculation of future trade prospects should be 
based on the greater of: 
(a) the average annual trade in the most recent representative three-year period, increased by 
the average annual growth rate of imports in that same period, or by 10 per cent, whichever is 
the greater; or 
(b) trade in the most recent year increased by 10 per cent. 
In no case shall a Member’s liability for compensation exceed that which would be entailed by complete 
withdrawal of the concession. 
7. Any Member having a principal supplying interest, whether as provided for in paragraph 1 above or in 
paragraph 1 of Article XXVIII, in a concession which is modified or withdrawn shall be accorded an 
initial negotiating right in the compensatory concessions, unless another form of compensation is agreed 
by the Members concerned. 
D. Interpretation and Application of Article XXVIII  
1. Legal relevance of Article XXVIII negotiations in interpretation of GATT Articles  
613. In EC – Poultry, Brazil claimed that the MFN principle in Articles I and XIII did not apply to tariff-rate 
quotas resulting from compensation negotiations under GATT Article XXVIII. The Panel rejected this argument 
and held:  
“[I]f a preferential treatment of a particular trading partner not elsewhere justified is permitted under the 
pretext of ‘compensatory adjustment’ under Article XXVIII:2, it would create a serious loophole in the 
multilateral trading system. Such a result would fundamentally alter the overall balance of concessions 
Article XXVIII is designed to achieve.” 
614. The Panel concluded that a tariff-rate quota which resulted from negotiations under Article XXVIII of the 
GATT 1947, and which was incorporated into a Member's Uruguay Round Schedule, must be administered in a 
non-discriminatory manner consistent with Article XIII of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body agreed:  
“We see nothing in Article XXVIII to suggest that compensation negotiated within its framework may 
be exempt from compliance with the non-discrimination principle inscribed in Articles I and XIII of the 
GATT 1994. As the Panel observed, this interpretation is, furthermore, supported by the negotiating 
history of Article XXVIII. Regarding the provision which eventually became Article XXVIII:3, the 
Chairman of the Tariff Agreements Committee at Geneva in 1947, concluded: 
‘It was agreed that there was no intention to interfere in any way with the operation of the 
most-favoured-nation clause. This Article is headed ‘Modification of Schedules’. It refers 
throughout to concessions negotiated under paragraph 1 of Article II, the Schedules, and there 
is no reference to Article I, which is the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause. Therefore, I think the 
intent is clear: that in no way should this Article interfere with the operation of the Most-
Favoured-Nation Clause.’ 
Although this statement refers specifically to the MFN clause in Article I of the GATT, logic requires 
that it applies equally to the non-discriminatory administration of quotas and tariff-rate quotas under 
Article XIII of the GATT 1994.” 
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2. Review of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994  
615. On 24 January 2000, the Council for Trade in Goods requested the Committee on Market Access to conduct 
the review envisaged in paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 
1994. On 12 October 2000, the Committee on Market Access agreed to report to the Council for Trade in Goods 
that the review had been carried out as mandated by that body and that, at that stage, there was no basis to change 
the criterion contained in paragraph 1 of the aforementioned Understanding, with a reservation that in the future 
any Member would be free to raise this matter when necessary. 
 
3. Reference to GATT Practice  
616. With respect to GATT practice under Article XXVIII, see GATT Analytical Index, pages 933-984.  
XXX. Article XXVIII bis  
A. Text of Article XXVIII bis  
Article XXVIII bis: Tariff Negotiations 
1. The contracting parties recognize that customs duties often constitute serious obstacles to trade; thus 
negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis, directed to the substantial reduction of the 
general level of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports and in particular to the reduction of such 
high tariffs as discourage the importation even of minimum quantities, and conducted with due regard to 
the objectives of this Agreement and the varying needs of individual contracting parties, are of great 
importance to the expansion of international trade. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may therefore 
sponsor such negotiations from time to time. 
2. (a) Negotiations under this Article may be carried out on a selective product-by-product basis or by 
the application of such multilateral procedures as may be accepted by the contracting parties concerned. 
Such negotiations may be directed towards the reduction of duties, the binding of duties at then existing 
levels or undertakings that individual duties or the average duties on specified categories of products 
shall not exceed specified levels. The binding against increase of low duties or of duty-free treatment 
shall, in principle, be recognized as a concession equivalent in value to the reduction of high duties. 
(b) The contracting parties recognize that in general the success of multilateral negotiations would 
depend on the participation of all contracting parties which conduct a substantial proportion of their 
external trade with one another. 
3. Negotiations shall be conducted on a basis which affords adequate opportunity to take into account: 
(a) the needs of individual contracting parties and individual industries; 
(b) the needs of less-developed countries for a more flexible use of tariff protection to assist 
their economic development and the special needs of these countries to maintain tariffs for 
revenue purposes; and 
(c) all other relevant circumstances, including the fiscal,* developmental, strategic and other 
needs of the contracting parties concerned. 
B. Text of AD Article XXVIII bis  
Ad Article XXVIII bis Paragraph 3 
It is understood that the reference to fiscal needs would include the revenues aspect of duties and 
particularly duties imposed primarily for revenue purpose, or duties imposed on products which can be 
substituted for products subject to revenue duties to prevent the avoidance of such duties. 
C. Interpretation and Application of Article XXVIII bis  
No jurisprudence or decision of a competent WTO body. 
 71
Appendix B 
 
BISD 27S/26-28   March 1981 (annexes are not reproduced) 
 
PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE XXVIII 
 
Guidelines adopted on 10 November 1980 
(C/113 and Corr.1) 
 
1. A contracting party intending to negotiate for the modification or withdrawal of concessions in accordance 
with the procedures of Article XXVIII, paragraph 1 - which are also applicable to negotiations under paragraph 5 of 
that Article - should transmit a notification to that effect to the secretariat which will distribute the notification to all 
other contracting parties in a secret document.1 In the case of negotiations under paragraph 4 of Article XXVIII the 
request for authority to enter into negotiations should be transmitted to the secretariat to be circulated in a secret 
document and included in the agenda of the next meeting of the Council. 
 
2. The notification or request should include a list of items, with corresponding tariff line numbers, which it is 
intended to modify or withdraw indicating for each item the contracting parties, if any, with which the item was 
initially negotiated. It should be indicated whether the intention is to modify a concession or withdraw it, in whole or 
in part, from the schedule. If a concession is to be modified, the proposed modification should be stated in the 
notification or circulated as soon as possible thereafter to those contracting parties with which the concession was 
originally negotiated and those which are recognized, in accordance with paragraph 4 below, to have a principal or a 
substantial supplying interest. The notification or request should be accompanied by statistics of imports of the 
products involved, by country of origin, for the last three years for which statistics are available. If specific or mixed 
duties are affected, both values and quantities should be indicated, if possible. 
 
3. At the same time as the notification is transmitted to the secretariat or when the authorization to enter into 
negotiations has been granted by the Council - or as soon as possible thereafter - the contracting party referred to in 
paragraph 1 above should communicate to those contracting parties, with which concessions were initially negotiated, 
and those which have a principal supplying interest, the compensatory adjustments which it is prepared to offer. 
 
4. Any contracting party which considers that it has a principal or a substantial supplying interest in a 
concession which is to be the subject of negotiation and consultation under Article XXVIII should communicate its 
claim in writing to the contracting party referred to in paragraph 1 above and at the same time inform the secretariat. If 
the contracting party referred to in paragraph 1 above recognizes the claim, the recognition will constitute a 
determination by the CONTRACTING PARTIES of interest in the sense of Article XXVIII:1.2 If a claim of interest is 
not recognized, the contracting party making the claim may refer the matter to the Council. Claims of interest should 
be made within ninety days following the circulation of the import statistics referred to in paragraph 2 above. 
 
5. Upon completion of each bilateral negotiation the contracting party referred to in paragraph 1 above should 
send to the secretariat a joint letter on the lines of the model in Annex A attached hereto signed by both parties. To 
this letter shall be attached a report on the lines of the model in Annex B attached hereto. The report should be 
initialled by both parties. The secretariat will distribute the letter and the report to all contracting parties in a secret 
document. 
 
6. Upon completion of all its negotiations the contracting party referred to in paragraph 1 above should send to 
the secretariat, for distribution in a secret document, a final report on the lines of the model in Annex C attached 
hereto. 
 
7. Contracting parties will be free to give effect to the changes agreed upon in the 
negotiations as from the first day of the period referred to in Article XXVIII:1, or, in the case of 
                                                          
1 The date for submission of a notification for negotiation under Article XXVIII, paragraph 1, shall comply with the 
provisions of interpretative note 3 to paragraph 1 of Article XXVIII. 
  
2 If, in exceptional circumstances, the contracting party referred to in paragraph 1 above is not in a position to supply 
relevant import statistics, it shall give due consideration to export statistics provided by contracting parties claiming an 
interest in the concession or concessions concerned. 
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negotiations under paragraph 4 or 5 of Article XXVIII, as from the date on which the conclusion of all the 
negotiations have been notified as set out in paragraph 6 above. A notification shall be submitted to the secretariat, for 
circulation to contracting parties, of the date on which these changes will come into force. 
 
8. Formal effect will be given to the changes in the schedules by means of Certifications in accordance with 
the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 26 March 1980.1 
 
9. The secretariat will be available at all stages to assist the governments involved in the negotiations and 
consultations. 
 
10. These procedures are in relevant parts also valid for renegotiations under Article XVIII, paragraph 7, and 
Article XXIV, paragraph 6. 
_____________ 
 1 See page 25. 
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Appendic C. Banana Supply in the EU 
Tons               
ORIGIN 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
EU  737,452 699,476 705,759 643,691 584,622 658,206 684,605 810,537 786,232 729,304 782,175 767,268 790,621 754,215 
Greece 17,810 18,354 8,084 7,233 3,071 3,138 3,807 3,901 3,589 3,336 3,275 2,909 2,433 2,670 
Spain 416,073 354,400 349,452 330,875 321,555 369,387 345,943 403,999 437,414 362,188 397,578 420,919 407,343 400,941 
France 265,666 294,845 313,610 279,837 234,130 251,280 310,652 374,747 314,793 342,009 358,861 322,758 358,943 329,223 
Martinique 194,498 185,836 198,199 180,861 151,965 188,073 249,733 277,013 240,499 258,501 271,269 233,716 263,880 243,706 
Guadeloupe 71,168 109,009 115,411 98,976 82,165 63,207 60,919 97,734 74,294 83,508 87,592 89,042 95,063 85,517 
Portugal 37,903 31,877 34,613 25,746 25,866 34,401 24,203 27,890 30,436 21,771 22,461 20,682 21,903 21,382 
               
ACP 
Countries 
621,910 596,438 680,205 748,126 726,987 763,965 800,075 693,054 654,853 675,987 755,787 728,776 726,681 786,555 
ex-Trad.ACP 617,606 584,519 641,007 683,583 639,742 687,163 733,992 640,413 593,235 631,129 692,862 639,104 625,884 674,835 
Cameroon* 77,628 115,116 110,357 146,901 158,166 165,289 166,622 157,123 155,000 160,638 204,978 215,455 229,913 292,868 
Ivory-Coast 95,189 116,407 144,307 161,258 149,084 160,269 180,735 166,247 158,243 192,522 200,163 216,699 210,788 202,036 
Belize 24,040 19,617 28,494 38,516 46,980 41,126 54,109 53,144 53,431 55,650 68,558 51,609 38,178 73,806 
Jamaïca 63,181 70,117 74,826 77,390 76,294 83,751 89,493 76,978 61,929 51,635 40,941 42,958 40,600 41,775 
Saint-Lucia 127,225 99,824 122,066 113,303 91,542 101,492 106,628 70,686 70,461 65,532 72,566 34,727 49,313 32,520 
Saint-Vincent 81,535 62,263 71,320 57,608 32,055 47,673 44,173 29,981 38,737 37,910 42,923 30,829 32,520 20,911 
Dominique 52,415 54,154 51,606 52,699 42,868 33,260 39,138 35,290 27,144 27,583 27,713 17,516 17,467 10,472 
Grenada 8,189 8,186 6,015 6,720 5,325 4,558 2,007 101 54 621 784 591 557 448 
Surinam 27,705 27,745 29,950 27,984 32,721 27,984 25,966 29,257 21,218 39,029 34,234 28,720 6,548 0 
Somalia 57,785 8,081 181 501 4,634 21,701 25,121 21,608 7,018 0 0 0 0 0 
Cape Verde 2,715 3,011 1,876 684 73 60 0 0 0 10 2 0 0 0 
Madagascar 0 0 10 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
ex non tr 
ACP 
4,304 11,919 39,199 64,543 87,245 76,803 66,082 52,641 61,619 44,858 62,925 89,673 100,797 111,720 
Dominican 
Rep 
3,836 9,703 38,512 61,677 86,074 75,045 61,250 49,031 56,199 42,217 59,807 85,886 97,331 109,434 
Ghana 62 551 100 218 383 1,589 2,797 3,194 4,233 2,526 2,972 3,345 3,201 928 
Other 406 1,665 587 2,648 788 168 2,036 416 1,186 115 146 441 265 1,358 
               
Dollar Zone 
in 1000 t 
2,362.8 2,640.6 2,730.8 2,559.7 2,450.0 2,405.1 2,470.3 2,462.1 2,426.4 2,521.8 2,543.1 2,474.6 2,5613 2,575.8 
Ecuador 381,014 646,209 745,058 650,631 612,039 632,174 685,695 738,474 568,534 696,789 690,893 705,071 828,822 798,462 
CostaRica 643,065 607,793 520,331 565,033 726,804 564,465 604,191 603,053 639,949 662,795 655,652 634,970 686,820 722,567 
Colombia 420,914 518,159 533,200 451,780 511,316 557,183 652,533 568,717 540,618 554,823 617,371 645,745 665,723 671,597 
Panama 648,937 591,392 601,095 568,702 426,932 415,634 310,741 357,921 416,907 422,398 389,044 347,869 307,047 303,471 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 161 119 4,059 12,673 16,624 36,053 46,421 
Venezuela 50 40 45 147 1,854 13,346 17,789 30,189 30,069 41,472 18,240 12,113 9,276 11,981 
Honduras 174,296 181,389 239,184 204,048 27,535 56,030 114,256 70,445 150,714 68,168 107,793 106,432 20,396 10,798 
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,178 5,311 5,393 
Guatemala 15,994 17,665 39,700 32,538 20,041 57,536 61,824 58,329 61,227 42,402 30,094 3,160 49 1,685 
Mexico 41 38 11,045 112 58 50 1,605 2,828 6,823 11,853 1,077 54 38 129 
Nicaragua 49,533 59,521 28,816 10,553 8 0 12,610 29,674 10,740 15,336 19,855 1,160 849 43 
Other 13,660 5,668 5,055 6,481 3,888 3,390 2,771 1,686 707 1,728 442 190 870 2,460 
Undefined 15,298 12,706 7,225 69,639 119,503 105,322 6,266 624 0 0 0 0 0 829 
               
ACP+ $Z 
in 1000 t 
2,984.7 3,237.0 3,411.0 3,307.8 3,177.0 3,169.1 3,270.4 3,155.1 3,081.3 3,197.8 3,298.9 3,203.3 3,287.9 3,362.4 
               
ACP+$+EU 
in 1000 t 
3,722.2 3,936.5 4,116.7 3,951.5 3,761.6 3,827.3 3,955.0 3,965.7 3,867.5 3,927.1 4,081.1 3,970.6 4,078.6 4,116.6 
Updated : DV 20/4/2004            
* Imports From Cameroon in 1998 are estimated at 155 000 t.    
Source: MS Communications (EU) / Comext (ACP & DOLLAR Z.) / Austria, Finland and Sweden 1990-1994 from respective 
national trade statistics 
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Appendix D  
[Taken from 05665en.pdf, for the EU Agrifin working party of 17 December 1999] 
Calculation of the financial implications of the proposal  
 
Calculation data normal year 
 
1. Union banana balance sheet  3 934 000 
(a) EU quota  854 000 
volume used 854 000 
unused  0 
(b) bound quota (A)  2 200 000 
(c) autonomous quota (B)  353 000 
volume available  2 553 000 
average volume used  2 420 000 
unused  133 000 
(d) traditional ACP (C)  850 000 
volume used  660 000 
unused  190 000 
additional total available  323 000 
 
2. Use of available quantities 
(a) total quantities added t  323 000 
(b) increase in supply %  8,2% 
(c) reverse demand elasticity  -1,54 
(d) resulting price reduction %  -12.6% 
(e) average CIF prices recorded EUR/t  528,0 
(f) unit reduction of prices EUR/t  -66,7 
(g) new prices resulting EUR/t  461,3 
(h) additional reduction – increased competition %  -5% 
(i) additional unit reduction of prices EUR/t  -23,1 
(j) total unit reduction EUR/t  -89,8 
(k) total price drop %  -17,0% 
 
3. Total supplementary expenditure EUR million  77 
 
4. Revenue from customs duties 
(a) duties from the A and B quotas 75  10 
(b) estimated duties from the C quota  20 
 
5. Total additional duties UR million  30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
